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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A
GENERAL REGIME
Vincent-Joël Proulx*

I. Introduction
Existing literature and jurisprudence pay little attention to individual responsibility in international law beyond criminal liability. This is partly due
to the fact that, traditionally, international individual responsibility has predominantly been associated with criminal liability as opposed to focusing
on civil responsibility for wrongdoing. Consequently, the resulting distinction between “individual” and “criminal” responsibility signals that the former concept “concerns a target of responsibility” whereas the latter concept
1
“addresses the nature of the responsibility.” However, there is no compelling reason why the discourse of international individual responsibility can2
not be transposed away from the criminal paradigm to the civil dimension,
presumably with requisite adjustments.

*
Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore’s Faculty of Law; Member of
the International Law Association Study Group on Individual Responsibility in International
Law: lawvp@nus.edu.sg. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Sixth Annual
Junior Faculty Forum for International Law, International Law Association’s Global Seminar
on Individual Responsibility in International Law: Concepts and Consequences, NUS Faculty
of Law’s Research Seminar Series, and NUS Centre for International Law’s Junior Faculty
Workshop–TRILA Singapore. I am grateful for the feedback received from participants in
those events. I also express warm gratitude for the insightful comments received on previous
drafts from Upendra Acharya, Béatrice Bonafè, Jansen Calamita, Damian Chalmers, Yifeng
Chen, Simon Chesterman, Tom Grant, Devika Hovell, Dino Kritsiotis, Anne Orford, Judge
Raul Pangalangan, Enrique Prieto-Rios, Nicole Roughan, Alec Stone Sweet, Larissa van den
Herik, Nigel White, and Tan Hsien-Li. Additional thanks are owed to Tony Anghie, Miriam
Cohen, Chimène Keitner, Loretta Malintoppi and the Singapore Branch of the International
Law Association, Lorna McGregor, Lucy Reed, and Elsa Sardinha. I am indebted to the staff
of the Journal, especially Layan Charara, Robert Kuhn, and Ian Marshall Sander for superb
editorial assistance and professionalism. I am also grateful for the research support received
through the National University of Singapore Start-Up Grant (WBS No. R-241-000-138-133).
All views and errors are my own.
1.
STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 15 (3d ed. 2009).
2.
See Chimene I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 845 (2011); André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 615, 618
n.14 (2003).
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This Article focuses on a few tools at the disposal of the United Nations
Security Council (“UNSC”) to enhance individual (read: civil) responsibility
concerning nonstate terrorist actors with a view to opening other avenues of
inquiry regarding other subversive nonstate actors (“NSAs”), for instance in
the areas of transnational torts, human rights (“HR”) violations, and envi3
ronmental damage caused by business entities. As discussed in Part V, recent developments surrounding the application of the Alien Tort Claims Act
4
(“ATCA”) in the United States and the prospect of establishing a basis for
universal civil jurisdiction further signal that no such solid basis exists in
customary international law (or treaty law, for that matter) to hold corporations and individuals accountable for HR abuses, in large part because states
are not willing to accept it. Therefore, these developments have created implementation and enforcement gaps in different areas related to civil recovery for violations of international law, of which terrorism-related wrongs
form an important part.
Arguably, these developments have also engendered normative gaps
given that both the relevant primary and secondary norms are not always
clearly defined. In addressing these regulatory and enforcement gaps, I advocate turning to international institutions, particularly the UNSC, which
can play an important role in advancing or implementing individual responsibility in some circumstances. While acknowledging the relevance of other
domestic and transnational legal regimes geared toward the implementation
of civil liability (however limited), this Article’s overarching purpose is to
explore ways in which NSAs’ wrongful acts can be attributed to them and
their international civil individual responsibility (“ICIR”) invoked strictly on
the international plane, with a focus on the UNSC’s role in this framework.
While the other dimensions of this broader framework (for example, regional HR tribunals, domestic legislation and courts, and transnational legal
regimes) remain important, this account focuses primarily on the interna-

3.
Nonstate actors’ (“NSAs”) would-be civil liability in no way absolves states of
their own potential international responsibility in the chain of wrongdoing since, if such a scenario were permitted, injured parties might be stripped of meaningful access to a remedy for
international law violations. See CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 236 (2012); ANNE PETERS,
BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
165–66 (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016). For a more cynical view on imposing direct international responsibility on nonstate business enterprises, both in the HR and environmental
fields, see André Nollkaemper, Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International
Environmental Law: Three Perspectives, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 179, 191–99 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006).
4.
The Alien Tort Claims Act’s (“ATCA”) relevant provision provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a seminal case that launched contemporary U.S. HR litigation, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1980) (equating customary
international law with federal common law and recognizing a valid grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between foreigners under ATCA).
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tional legal framework. That said, these other dimensions will need to be
addressed in a broader inquiry about the contents and contours of ICIR, be it
5
in future scholarly projects or policy-based studies. By way of example,
certain international instruments delegate an obligation upon municipal legal systems to ensure civil liability for individuals’ violations of internation6
al law, including UN peacekeepers for sexual exploitation. Therefore, such
accountability models are grounded on the notion of holding individuals to
7
account through their home states. The UNSC has also emphasized the importance that “all troop- and police-contributing countries . . . take appropriate steps to hold accountable those personnel responsible for sexual exploitation and abuse and to report to the United Nations fully and promptly on
8
actions undertaken . . . .”

5.
For instance, “[n]ational civil or administrative courts may create a corpus of case
law on international responsibility, i.e., on the direct secondary international obligations of
natural and legal persons.” PETERS, supra note 3, at 163. A byproduct of this approach, either
expressly or implicitly, is to provide further contour and content to relevant international primary obligations (and secondary obligations) of NSAs and individuals. In turn, this instills the
relevant norms with a certain degree of foreseeability, making them known to potentially liable parties, thereby upholding the principle of legality. Moreover, domestic courts and their
judgments remain significant drivers of enforcement of those would-be obligations. See id. at
163–64.
6.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2272, ¶¶ 8–9, 11 (Mar. 11, 2016); G.A. Res. 71/278, ¶¶ 3–4
(Mar. 20, 2017); see also Standards of Conduct, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (emphasizing
the importance of addressing misconduct and stating that “[t]he disciplinary sanctions and any
other judicial actions remain the responsibility of the national jurisdiction of the individual
involved.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.1, at 56–57, art. 7, cmt., ¶¶ 1, 7 (2011).
7.
See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson & Emily Singer Hurvitz, Human Rights Violations by
Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2014); Lauren Gabrielle Blau, Note,
Victimizing Those They Were Sent to Protect: Enhancing Accountability for Children Born of
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 121
(2016). See generally RÓISÍN SARAH BURKE, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY UN
MILITARY CONTINGENTS (2014).
8.
S.C. Res. 2272, supra note 6, ¶ 11; see also id., at pmbl. See generally JEREMY
FARRALL ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL: POLICY PROPOSALS 23–24 (2016). Nevertheless, the academic and policy debate has centered considerably on perceived impunity and enforcement gaps in holding
both troop-contributing states and the UN accountable for peacekeepers’ violations of international law. Reform proposals have been articulated, inter alia, around the potential removal of
immunity before domestic courts, greater involvement of those courts in sanctioning unlawful
behavior, the prospect of shared responsibility between wrongdoing entities, and instituting
international bodies to handle such matters. See, e.g., Simone F. van den Driest, Tracing the
Human Rights Obligations of UN Peacekeeping Operations, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT 179 (James
Summers & Alex Gough eds., 2018); Kristen E. Boon, The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341 (2016); Andrew Ladley, Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability
on International Peace Operations, 1 POL. & ETHICS REV. 81 (2005).
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Under the heading of ICIR, I intend to capture any conduct carried out
by NSAs or individuals that violates international law—using anti-terrorism
obligations as the principal but not exclusive case study—to identify applicable secondary norms of liability and legal consequences flowing from
such breaches outside the criminal paradigm. Indeed, international law has
long recognized that the commission of an internationally wrongful act triggers the wrongdoing party’s international responsibility and corresponding
duty to repair the harm. While this classical doctrine was traditionally applied to sovereign states, I argue that it is valid to extend it to NSAs and individuals through ICIR, both on descriptive and prescriptive grounds. In
some ways, therefore, this account attempts to reclaim the doctrine of international responsibility back from the fragmentation of international legal
personality. In other words, international lawyers tend to fragment the legal
personality of nonstate entities and individuals depending on what type of
legal person they are dealing with, presumably to determine the scope and
extent of that person’s rights and obligations.
In contrast, this Article argues that it is important to conceive of the meta-category of “nonstate actors” more broadly before nose-diving into more
discrete aspects of the overarching problem. Thus, in this Article, I use the
term “individual responsibility” in international law as a default category to
capture responsibility concerning all manner of NSAs (for example, armed
opposition groups, terrorist networks, and corporations) and individuals (for
example, individual terrorists, State officials, and leaders of armed groups).
As a corollary, I also use the term “nonstate actors” as a default category to
encompass all these actors and others that could fall under this rubric. Otherwise put, it would be methodologically imprudent to focus solely on individuals (that is, natural persons) or nonstate entities (that is, legal persons)
in the analysis, as the elucidation of ICIR requires acknowledging that both
categories are intertwined. This is especially true when considering how the
law of state responsibility (“SR”) has been artificially stretched to address
9
the subversive acts of nonstate groups.
The contents and contours of the obligations of NSAs and individuals,
both primary and secondary, need greater clarity in certain areas. This account attempts to address this normative dearth. Moreover, it may well be
that a single factual complex leads to a concurrence between individual
criminal liability and individual civil liability, another important feature of a
would-be ICIR regime this Article acknowledges. In focusing primarily on
the civil dimensions of international wrongdoing, this account not only at9.
In the context of use of force by NSAs, consider Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of
Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits of Attribution of Conduct, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563
(2017) (highlighting the challenges in applying classic state responsibility (“SR”) norms to the
subversive conduct of NSAs and advocating a complicity-based model). On a different note,
see Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 798, 815–16 (2002) (arguing that the extant, codified law of SR is insufficiently forward-looking since it fails to expressly empower NSAs to invoke states’ international responsibility).

Winter 2019]

International Civil Individual Responsibility

219

tempts to address the abovementioned normative and enforcement voids,
but also to advance the discourse on the legal consequences flowing from
ICIR. At the core, holding an individual or other NSA internationally liable
in civil terms is primarily about generating declarations of illegality and
strengthening the narrative against impunity. In developing its sanctions regime, the UNSC has been clear that its aim is preventive rather than punitive. The would-be ICIR regime advocated herein not only aligns with this
overarching objective but also proves compatible—and complementary in a
meaningful manner—with that general sanctions regime. With this in mind,
this account strives to contribute a new perspective to the Kadi-related literature.
My objective is also to move the debate beyond these obvious points
toward a more robust remedial model, envisaging a general ICIR regime in
which compensation is an available remedy along with other measures. In
so doing, three central arguments run through the Article to support the
elaboration of an ICIR regime, at times mutually reinforcing each other.
First, the principled argument suggests that we may extrapolate from existing doctrine, particularly SR law and the broader framework and language
of international responsibility, to inform and shape a general ICIR regime.
Second, the precedent argument implies that, since the UNSC interprets its
powers very broadly and imposes several measures reconcilable with the
essence of the international responsibility framework, it could move into a
quasi-legislative and implementation space where it regulates and sanctions
the unlawful conduct of NSAs more squarely. In fact, it has already done so
very plainly with respect to regulation and at times less clearly with respect
to implementation of individual responsibility. Finally, the pragmatic policy
argument signals that the international community must take effective
measures against subversive individuals and NSAs (for example, terrorist
groups, guerrilla leaders, and irresponsible corporations), especially given
the regulatory and enforcement gaps identified above.
Part II examines the extant individual civil responsibility legal regime
(or lack thereof) and highlights the networks of multi-leveled relationships
of responsibility and the multi-actor processes that serve as incubators for
actuating individual responsibility. Focusing on the problematic regulation
and accountability of nonstate terrorist actors and emphasizing the interaction between relevant legal regimes, the Article discusses the UNSC’s role
within this framework. In Part III, I analyze some of the UNSC’s “legislative” forays, primarily but not exclusively in the counterterrorism field, assessing their impact on the prospect of enhancing international individual
responsibility mechanisms beyond criminal responsibility.
Part IV explores the UNSC’s role in implementing individual responsibility stemming from NSAs’ wrongful acts, emphasizing that organ’s attribution of illegal conduct and/or responsibility to such entities. Drawing from
SR logic, I canvass select aspects of relevant practice in which the UNSC
imposed a range of secondary, remedial obligations on wrongdoing individuals/groups. This Part also reviews other proposals to enhance individual
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accountability mechanisms—including a role for the UNSC in combating
terrorism—which remain complementary with a would-be ICIR regime.
These include UNSC referrals under the Rome Statute and broadening the
International Criminal Court’s (“ICC”) jurisdiction to encompass “terrorism.” Part V offers reflections on the prospects and limits of the proposed
ICIR model.

II. Making Individual Responsibility More Effective: The
Importance of Regime Interaction and the UNSC’s Role
International law currently lacks a general framework for ICIR. Recent
developments in international law across a variety of regimes, however,
suggest a growing demand, or at least an interest, in promulgating an operative notion of international civil individual responsibility. This Article
builds upon those developments by outlining a potential framework for
ICIR, one that draws from the SR repertoire but calls for accordant adjustments to fit the peculiarities of ICIR.

A. Nonstate Actors and the Current Regime of
International Responsibility
NSAs have gained increasing importance internationally, first and
10
foremost as trendsetters but also as norm-creators and norm-enforcers. As
the world shifts toward a multipolar reality, NSAs’ participation and influ11
ence in international law should not be underestimated. For instance, the
emergence of transnational terrorist networks has illuminated potential deficiencies in the extant international legal system, particularly as regards at12
tribution principles and self-defense standards. The actions of groups like
10.
See, e.g., ROBERT MANDEL, GLOBAL SECURITY UPHEAVAL: ARMED NONSTATE
GROUPS USURPING STATE STABILITY FUNCTIONS (2013); VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN
WORLD POLITICS (Klejda Mulaj ed., 2010); NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS
(Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009); Eric Dannenmaier, The Role of Non-State Actors in Climate
Compliance, in PROMOTING COMPLIANCE IN AN EVOLVING CLIMATE REGIME 149 (Jutta
Brunnée et al. eds., 2012); Douglas Guilfoyle, Somali Pirates as Agents of Change in International Law-Making and Organisation, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 81 (2012).
11.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS (Andrew Clapham ed.,
2013); NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005); PARTICIPANTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011).
12.
For instance, it is unclear whether classical rules have been adjusted, supplanted, or
modified to accommodate self-defense against nonstate terrorists when the territorial state is
“unwilling or unable” to thwart their activities, even absent a clear nexus (that is, attribution)
between that state and the terrorists’ conduct. A sovereignty-corrosive loosening of selfdefense principles might pose serious challenges in the North-South divide. Cf. Ashley S.
Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial SelfDefense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012); Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare,
and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244 (2011); Michael P. Scharf,
How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15
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Al-Qaeda, Daesh/ISIL, and Al-Shabaab, which sometimes wield state-like
territorial control, influence, and military capacity, elude classical attribution theory, at least if centered on a strict agency paradigm. Indeed, agency
seems to be the dominant model under the International Law Commission’s
(“ILC”) 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (“the ARSIWA”), thereby highlighting their inadequacy in
addressing the unlawful conduct of subversive NSAs.
By contrast, a group like Hezbollah falls into the interstices of different
heads of attribution, eschewing straightforward classification and blurring
the distinction between “acts of State” and non-attributable conduct. Its relationship to the Lebanese government likely belongs somewhere between the
two extremes along the complete autonomy–complete dependency continu13
um. While some argue that Lebanon’s responsibility could be engaged for
14
Hezbollah’s terrorist activities, what is important for present purposes is
that the UNSC required “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese
15
and non-Lebanese militias” in Lebanon, encompassing Hezbollah’s armed
wing, however defined under SR, and other nonstate extremist groups.
The UNSC addressed similar disarmament calls to Boko Haram and
Daesh/ISIL in even more straightforward language. The UNSC added that
individuals and groups responsible for perpetrating terrorist attacks and violations of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and HR law should be
16
held legally accountable. That said, these resolutions also oblige states to
take measures to counteract the unlawful conduct of individuals and NSAs,
a phenomenon which also runs through both the UNSC’s comprehensive
sanctions against individual states and its targeted sanctions against individ17
uals suspected of supporting or engaging in terrorism. Therefore, in such
scenarios, the targeted individuals and/or nonstate entities are still largely

(2016); Kimberley N Trapp, Actor-Pluralism, the ‘Turn to Responsibility’ and the Jus ad Bellum: ‘Unwilling or Unable’ in Context, 2 J. USE FORCE & INT’L L. 199 (2015).
13.
See Gérard Cahin, The Responsibility of Other Entities: Armed Bands and Criminal
Groups, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 331, 335 (James Crawford et al.
eds., 2010); Enzo Cannizzaro, Entités Non-étatiques et Régime International de l’Emploi de la
Force: Une Etude Sur Le Cas de la Réaction Israélienne au Liban, 111 REVUE GENERALE DE
DROIT INT’L PUB. 333, 339 (2007).
14.
See Stefan Kirchner, Third Party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks Against Israel, 7
GERMAN L.J. 777, 779 (2006).
15.
S.C. Res. 1559, ¶ 3 (Sept. 2, 2004).
16.
See S.C. Res. 2396, ¶ 19 (Dec. 21, 2017); S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2017). See
generally S.C. Res. 2354, at pmbl. (May 24, 2017).
17.
For instance, one common formulation employed by the UNSC is to call upon “all
States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdiction . . . act in conformity with United Nations embargoes, . . . and, as appropriate, take the
necessary judicial and administrative action to end any illegal activities by those individuals
and companies . . . .” See S.C. Res. 1343, ¶ 21 (Mar. 7, 2001) (on Sierra Leone); see also S.C.
Res. 1408, ¶ 18 (May 6, 2002).
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“mediated through their States (or, in the case of the EU, through the
18
EU).”
Nevertheless, these UNSC forays suggest that it is targeting nonstate
groups/individuals with its prescriptions. While SR may address state failures to give effect to them, individual responsibility also remains relevant in
the post-breach calculus. For instance, the UNSC recently emphatically
condemned “all attacks, including improvised device attacks, suicide attacks, assassinations and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction
19
and development efforts in Afghanistan . . . .” It further condemned “the
use by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network as well as Al-Qaida,
ISIL (Da’esh) affiliates, and by other terrorist groups, violent and extremist
20
groups, and illegal armed groups of civilians as human shields, . . . .” More
importantly, the Council not only emphasized the importance of establishing
the individual responsibility of such NSAs, but it confirmed the interdependence between states’ obligations (the violation of which can trigger SR)
and the establishment of individual responsibility. It underscored “the need
to hold [the abovementioned] perpetrators, organizers, financiers and spon21
sors of such acts accountable and bring them to justice . . . .” It also
“urge[d] all states, in accordance with their obligations under international
law and relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate actively with the
Government of Afghanistan and all other relevant authorities in this re22
gard . . . .”
Unsurprisingly, post-9/11 events prompted scholars to investigate SR’s
23
role in combating terrorism. More generally, the above developments
share some connection with broader efforts to better define the individual’s
24
role and place within the international legal system. Within SR, this quest
18.
PETERS, supra note 3, at 94.
19.
S.C. Res. 2405, ¶ 23 (Mar. 8, 2018).
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.; see id. ¶ 33 (denouncing “the continued high levels of child casualties and recruitment and use of children in Afghanistan, in particular by terrorist and extremist groups”,
and calling for “those responsible to be brought to justice”).
23.
See ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, JR., NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING
THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE (2008); TAL
BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2006);
VINCENT-JOËL PROULX,
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: A NEW THEORY OF PREVENTION (2012); KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2011).
24.
See generally KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999); 34
THESAURUS ACROASIUM: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Kalliopi Koufa ed.,
2006); Andrew Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
25 (2010);

Winter 2019]

International Civil Individual Responsibility

223

to circumscribe the individual’s legal situation has directly affected the modalities of secondary norms and the types of responsibility envisaged to capture private entities’ wrongful conduct. Indeed, “[p]ast efforts to distinguish
between direct and indirect responsibility were explained by the need to lo25
cate the individual within the system.”
Moreover, conceptual, evidentiary, and practical limitations of SR precepts in tackling terrorism are further exacerbated when transposed to the
cyber-realm, in which case extant legal standards are inadequate to govern
26
cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare. Recent developments suggest that the
post-World War II, bilateral typology of international relations, including
SR and use of force rules, is no longer suitable to govern situations falling
outside a strict state-based bilateral and/or symmetric paradigm, especially
regarding the subversive acts of powerful NSAs (for example, transnational
terrorist networks). We must identify outside-the-box solutions to regulate
individual accountability beyond criminal responsibility in order to address
the blind spots of SR and other legal schemes premised on perhaps outdated
27
(read: overly bilateral or state-centric) logic. For one thing, the mechanism
of criminal responsibility might become ineffective given the inability to
secure custody over accused individuals, prosecutorial discretion, resource
constraints, etc.
As a starting-point, the ARSIWA include a savings clause ensuring that
the ILC’s finalized text does not impinge on the further development of international individual responsibility mechanisms. Article 58 provides that

25.
Emmanuel Roucounas, Non-State Actors: Areas of International Responsibility in
Need of Further Exploration, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 391, 392 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 61–65,
91–122 (2002).
26.
See, e.g., Constantine Antonopoulos, State Responsibility in Cyberspace, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 55 (Nikolaos Tsagourias
& Russell Buchan eds., 2015); Zhxiong Huang, The Attribution Rules in ILC’s Articles on
State Responsibility: A Preliminary Assessment on Their Application to Cyber Operations, 14
BALTIC YEARBOOK INT’L L. 41 (2014); Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks:
Technology’s Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 496 (2013).
On the inadequacy of “control”-based legal standards under attribution theory, see Kristen E.
Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution Doctrines,
15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 330 (2014).
27.
Cf. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); José Alvarez, The
Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223 (2011); Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of
Statehood, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 397 (1991); Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State,
56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993); Susan Marks, State-Centrism, International Law, and the Anxieties of Influence, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 339, 340 (2006); Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the
Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7
(1998); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993); James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 193 (1999).
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“[t]hese articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a
28
State.” Particularly relevant is the commentary to that provision. It confirms that the term “individual responsibility” does not exclusively connote
criminal liability since “it is not excluded that developments may occur in
29
the field of individual civil responsibility.” The drafting history suggests
that Article 58’s primary rationale was to maintain a rigid distinction between individual criminal responsibility and SR, driven by the desire to
avoid concluding that every finding of SR also ipso facto results in a finding
of individual criminal liability. However, that same record indicates that this
provision is sufficiently broad to capture something qualitatively different
30
from criminal responsibility. Furthermore, there is every indication that
Article 58 should not be read as exhaustive, in that international law may
develop to recognize the international civil liability of private persons not
acting on behalf of a State. Otherwise put, even though the provision only
refers to individual responsibility for individual conduct “ ‘on behalf of the
State,’ it does not prohibit individual responsibility under international law
31
for purely private conduct without direction by the State.” In fact, there is
32
ample evidence that such liability already exists in certain circumstances.
For example, the UN Convention against Torture (“UNCAT”) primarily
requires states parties to fulfill certain obligations (for example, legislate,
investigate, and extradite) for the purposes of submitting the prohibited
conduct to their competent authorities for criminal prosecution. Individuals
carry out the proscribed behavior, be they acting under the color of state authority or in their private capacity. In addition, this instrument also enshrines a provision that ensures the ability to secure civil liability-type repa-

28.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 30, art. 58 (2001); [hereinafter the ARSIWA]. Conversely, the ARSIWA also reserve the right of NSAs to invoke and implement SR. See id. art.
33, ¶ 2; see also id. pt. III, ch. I, cmt. On the ARSIWA’s shortcomings in bolstering SR invocation and implementation mechanisms for NSAs, see Brown Weiss, supra note 9, at 799.
29.
The ARSIWA, supra note 28, art. 58, cmt., ¶ 2 (emphasis added); see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 25, at 312; PETERS, supra note 3, at 164 (expounding from that fact
that the individual can be the subject of a broader international responsibility, implying an
“advanced process of ‘humanization’ of international law”).
30.
See, e.g., Katja Creutz, International Responsibility and Problematic Law-Making,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN KLABBERS 171, 173–75 (Rain
Liivoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014) (inferring that “technically Article 58 is not limited to an
individual’s criminal responsibility only, but also includes individual civil responsibility”).
31.
PETERS, supra note 3, at 152 (adding that “[t]he provision is found in a text that
otherwise deals only with State responsibility. Its purpose is merely to cut off the argument
that the codified articles might rule out the individual responsibility of officeholders in addition to State responsibility.”).
32.
See id. at 152–53 and authorities cited therein; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 25,
at 312–13. On the civil liability of public officials in international law, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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ration, albeit pursued and ultimately implemented in the states parties’ domestic jurisdictions. Indeed, Article 14 of the UNCAT provides that:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or
other persons to compensation which may exist under na33
tional law.
Similar remedial avenues exist concerning the underexplored and illdefined potential ICIR arising from crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction, especially given that Article 75(6) of the Rome Statute does not prejudice the rights of victims to secure civil reparation under international or
34
domestic law. In many ways, Article 75 constitutes an important innovation, granting victims the right in some circumstances to secure reparations
35
for international crimes. Prior to the adoption of that instrument, victims
disposed of severely limited legal avenues outside of domestic contexts to
pursue civil-type reparations for international crimes. Pursuant to Article 79
of the Rome Statute, the Trust Fund for Victims was instituted by the Assembly of States Parties with a view, inter alia, to assisting victims in secur36
ing reparations. This development constitutes an integral and significant
33.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]; see also the
ARSIWA, supra note 28, art. 58, cmt., ¶ 2, n.838. International tribunals have confirmed that
individual criminal responsibility can be triggered when private individuals carry out acts of
torture, without the need for State involvement. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos.
IT-96-23; IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, ¶ 148 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). For a recent judicial interpretation of this provision, see
infra nn. 273–81 and accompanying text.
34.
On this eventuality with respect to the crime of aggression, see Friedrich Rosenfeld,
Individual Civil Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 249
(2012). On the UNSC’s reluctance to determine individual responsibility for aggression, see
PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 127–28
(2013). See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 75, ¶ 6, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as
prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law”.).
35.
See generally Carla Ferstman & Mariana Goetz, Reparations Before the International Criminal Court: The Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and Its Impact on
Future Reparations Proceedings, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 313
(Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009); Gioia Greco, Victims’ Rights Overview Under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 531 (2007).
36.
See
Reparation
Orders,
TRUST
FUND
FOR
VICTIMS,
https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-do/reparation-orders (last visited Mar. 16,
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feature of the ICC’s reparations practice and culture. More importantly, it
suggests that, by incorporating both criminal and reparative (that is, civil)
aspects, which work together, the ICC’s framework further indicates that
recovery based on ICIR might be available in international or domestic settings. Granted, under the ICC framework, reparations may only be sought
before the Court once there is a conviction, not to mention that the underly37
ing offenses must fall within the Court’s jurisdictional purview. Nevertheless, this limitation in no way precludes pursuing other avenues of recovery
based on ICIR in other domestic or transnational forums.
Despite these overtures, no general international legal framework to in38
voke and implement NSAs’ ICIR exists. Former ILC Special Rapporteur
James Crawford confirms as much: “[a] more recent addition to the discourse on international responsibility is the possibility of civil claims
against non-state actors,” but “[n]o manifestation of this concept yet exists
39
on the international plane.”
The fact that the ILC itself has not substantially addressed the legal situation of the individual in its work, including the vexed question of noncriminal individual responsibility, perhaps suggests that it is an intractable
topic. That said, the Commission considered and produced draft articles on
tangentially related sub-topics. For instance, it has studied and delivered
40
work on the issue of nationality, including the question of statelessness. As

2019); see also Peter G. Fischer, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal
Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187, 200–
01, 204–08 (2003); Dinah L. Shelton, Reparations for Victims of International Crimes, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 137 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2000). See generally STANISLAS KABALIRA,
THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) (2016).
37.
See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 75, ¶¶ 2, 4 (empowering the Court, inter alia,
to “make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or
in respect of, victims,” and “order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust
Fund provided for in article 79.”).
38.
See generally Christian Tomuschat, Private Individuals, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 317–29. The topic of international individual responsibility beyond criminal liability has generated very little attention beyond the
human rights field. One study exploring international individual obligations, the individual’s
international responsibility, and rights arising from such responsibility is found in PETERS,
supra note 3, at 60–193.
39.
JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 81 (2013) (adding that States rather
“incorporate international law norms into their own legal systems, thereby enabling the making of civil claims as an exercise of domestic jurisdiction.”); see also Tomuschat, supra note
38, at 318 (stating that “there is no general law regulating the status of private individuals in
international law.”). Even prior to the ARSIWA’s adoption, publicists lamented the lack of
reliable mechanisms to engage “the responsibility of international civil society[,]” which
“comprises non-State actors . . . .” See Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 392 (1999).
40.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/2693
(1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 140, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/
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discussed below, the topic of international individual responsibility beyond
criminal liability is increasingly relevant and is attracting attention in some
specialist circles. For instance, the International Law Association constituted a Study Group on Individual Responsibility in International Law, which
41
has studied the question for several years. The ILC and other important in42
stitutions should no longer ignore this topic. It should be explored with a
view to developing corresponding intellectual and conceptual foundations,
irrespective of its challenging nature and the parsimony of relevant practice.
Given the overall literary dearth on this question in scholarly and policy
circles, this Article attempts to articulate some embryonic foundations of a
potential framework to address it. In so doing, I rely on parallels with SR
law to inform a would-be ICIR regime relating to individuals and other
NSAs. This approach is not entirely foreign to the broad field of international responsibility. Indeed, the SR repertoire may and should be brought
to bear upon the present inquiry as an analogical tool. By way of example, it
has long been accepted that the law of treaties, originally envisaged as a
strictly interstate field, can be extended, analogized, and applied to other international actors (read: “nonstate” actors), such as international organizations or other nonstate entities (for example, armed opposition groups at the
end of armed hostilities or investors in the field of investment law). Much in
the same vein, SR law becomes a frame of reference for analyzing, dissecting, and articulating other modes of international responsibility beyond the
interstate paradigm, including in spaces corralling individuals and other
NSAs. Unsurprisingly, the SR repertoire was instrumental in guiding the
ILC when developing draft articles governing the responsibility of one type
of NSA—international organizations—although charges of a misplaced
“copy/paste” approach were leveled against it in that context, prompting it
43
to adjust its final product accordingly.
The ARSIWA’s central syllogistic device should also inform any legal
regime governing ICIR. Thus, once a state (in the proposed model, an indiAdd.l, at 140, 147–49; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 49 n.8. See generally PARLETT,
supra note 24.
41.
See Study Groups, INT’L L. ASS’N, http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups
(last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
42.
On the ILC’s past treatment of legal issues involving NSAs, see Gentian Zyberi,
Non-State Actors from the Perspective of the International Law Commission, in
PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NONSTATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 165.
43.
Compare the ARSIWA, supra note 28, with Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work
of its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.1, at 39–105 (2011). On the unsuitability
of certain SR norms for transposition to the international organizations context, see generally
Vincent-Joël Proulx, An Uneasy Transition? Linkages between the Law of State Responsibility
and the Law Governing the Responsibility of International Organizations, in RESPONSIBILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE 109 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2013). But see Christiane Ahlborn, The Use of Analogies Drafting the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations: An Appraisal of the “Copy-Paste
Approach,” 9 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 53 (2012).
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vidual/NSA/group) breaches a primary norm of substantive conduct (for example, perpetrating terrorism offenses or financing/supporting terrorism),
international law sets in motion the application of secondary (remedial)
norms, which translate into legal consequences stemming from the viola44
tion. Hence, the ARSIWA’s borrowed syllogistic reasoning consists of a
wrongful act committed by the NSA (as opposed to a state), amounting to
an action or omission invariably constituting a breach of its international obligation(s), which is then attributable to that entity/individual, thereby trig45
gering legal consequences enforceable against it. Presumably, when undertaking any analysis in the realm of ICIR, questions surrounding the wouldbe international legal personality of the relevant individual, NSA, or group
and its limits (that is, is it sufficient to generate legal responsibility?) will
arise and warrant consideration at the outset. After all, it must be recalled
that, in its famous Reparations Advisory Opinion, the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) equated the expressions “international person” and “subject
46
of international law.”
Thus, SR’s normative scheme only gets us so far. An obvious limitation
resides in the intrinsically different nature and character of the artificial construct of the state when compared to the wide gamut of NSAs, including
47
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). Moreover, once an international law violation is established between states, it creates a legal relationship which remains “on a level of parity” between the two players, despite
the wrongful act. Absent a competent international jurisdictional body to
decide the matter/order appropriate reparation, both the responsible state
and injured state “remain sovereign entities,” with the latter left to navigate
48
potential unilateral remedies to implement liability against the former.
Because of this peculiar structure, the prospect of an injured state unilaterally invoking/implementing SR entails a process of auto-qualifying the
dispute’s various aspects and, ultimately, self-judging both the legal breach
49
and its consequences. By contrast, a NSA that commits an international

44.
See generally Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 318. On the primary/secondary obligation dichotomy, see Eric David, Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 27; Giorgio Gaja, Primary and Secondary Rules in the International Law on State Responsibility, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 981 (2014).
45.
For this syllogism under extant SR repertoire, see the ARSIWA, supra note 28, art.
2 (on the wrongful act–breach attribution sequence); id. art. 28 (on the ensuing legal consequences).
46.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); see also PETERS, supra note 3, at 35–44, 414.
47.
On the potential international responsibility of NGOs, see Anna-Karin Lindblom,
The Responsibility of Other Entities: Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 343.
48.
See Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320.
49.
For a variety of views, see Denis Alland, The Definition of Countermeasures, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY supra note 13, at 1129; RENÉ PROVOST,
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law breach can be labeled the author of a criminal act or, as argued here, the
perpetrator of an internationally (civil) wrongful act. Consequently, nothing
prevents that juridical person/entity or an individual from being subjected to
an appropriate criminal or economic sanction. However, it should be
stressed that “[a] private individual does not have the same ‘ceremonial dig50
nity’ as a State.” Here, a key distinction lies in the horizontal enforcement
system endemic to SR and interstate disputes, as compared with the topdown enforcement approach applicable to individuals and NSAs. This is a
clear distinguishing factor between state-based liability and individual
and/or NSA-based liability, which is also reminiscent of one major difference between the international legal order and domestic legal systems.
Consequently, it is imperative to exercise caution in fashioning a secondary normative regime to govern NSAs’ (non-criminal) international responsibility. For instance, some SR remedial provisions would carry over
rather awkwardly to the realm of NSAs. Consider the oft-awarded remedy
of satisfaction, codified in Article 37 of the ARSIWA. It operates rather
seamlessly between sovereign states and is routinely relied upon by the ICJ
51
as adequate redress. Stepping away from the interstate dynamic,
“[a]pologies or expressions of regret . . . presented by an individual are no
more than a gesture of courtesy and do not have the same weight as official
52
apologies offered by a State.” Moreover, the immunity that most states enjoy with respect to their international jurisdiction further informs the overarching distinction between state-based liability and individual and/or NSAbased liability. A vital query for the architects of an ICIR regime will be to
determine why and in what circumstances individuals and other NSAs
should be held civilly liable at the international level. With respect to criminal liability, the traditional response has been that the international legal
system will fill the void when municipal jurisdictions are unable or unwill53
ing to prosecute domestically. The question remains, however, whether
this standard could also be transposed and applied to the civil international
responsibility of individuals and NSAs.
The sources and content of relevant primary norms may be difficult to
ascertain in some instances given that ICIR is an emerging conceptual field,
not to mention that it suffers from a paucity of relevant practice. Despite this
normative uncertainty, certain primary norms—the violation of which may
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 338 n.2 (2002); Leo Gross,
States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 167 (Leo Gross ed., 1993); HANS
KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 13–14 (1944).
50.
Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320.
51.
See the ARSIWA, supra note 28, art 37. For a critical take on the ICJ’s use of satisfaction, see Juliette McIntyre, The Declaratory Judgment in Recent Jurisprudence of the ICJ:
Conflicting Approaches to State Responsibility?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 177 (2016).
52.
Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320.
53.
See, e.g., the complementary nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which also affects the
admissibility of claims it can hear. Rome Statute, supra note 34, at pmbl., arts. 1, 17.
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lead to establishing ICIR—can nonetheless be grounded in specific international instruments. Indeed, classical publicists confirmed that certain treaty
provisions directly obligate individuals to observe certain behavioral requirements and establish ICIR in the case of breach, even if the resulting
54
reparation is defined and ultimately governed by domestic legal systems.
Draft conventions in international nuclear and environmental law have
included civil liability provisions for maritime oil pollution, nuclear dam55
age, and transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. While these instruments would engender the liability of private persons and operators in
specific circumstances, they have not entered into force. Nevertheless, that
states and other relevant actors have drafted such conventions suggests a
movement toward ICIR, as these draft instruments must be contrasted with
treaties whose violation entails state-based liability. A key cross-sectoral
civil liability convention of this kind is the Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environ56
ment, which also has yet to enter into force. The above draft instruments
seek to introduce secondary obligations binding upon NSAs and individuals
to regulate their liability in the event they carry out conduct falling within
the purview of the conventions (for example, pollution). However, whether
such instruments also ground primary substantive norms of conduct governing the behavior of individuals and enterprises directly remains a more
vexed question. One attractive construction would be to simply surmise that
57
“the treaties place duties on businesses not to cause pollution.” A more
careful analysis might reveal stricter conditions in which primary norms
binding individuals and NSAs directly could be read into those instru58
ments.
These conventions generally require signatory states to impose sanctions to assist in enforcing the obligations of private actors (typically business entities)—whose unlawful conduct may attract liability under the relevant instruments—and ensure the implementation of their duty to provide
compensation. Consequently, the more traditional construction of most of
these instruments implies that they cannot give rise to liability of private en54.
See Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law
with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 537–38
(1943) (discussing Article II of the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine
Telegraph Cables).
55.
See PETERS, supra note 3, at 153–54.
56.
See generally Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, E.T.S. No. 150 (not in force).
57.
Steven R. Ratner, Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 807, 814 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
58.
See PETERS, supra note 3, at 154. See generally id. At 60–114. For a cynical take
on whether international liability regimes “will play a significant role as a tool for environmental protection[,]” see Jutta Brunnée, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International
Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 351, 367
(2004).
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59

tities directly under international law. Yet, upon closer inspection, the
wording of some of these instruments suggests that international individual
responsibility could be established for their violation, although they would
need to be “sufficiently specific and complete in the sense that no further
60
national provisions would be needed to specify” the relevant obligations.
Otherwise put, to achieve this standard, the instruments must enshrine “unambiguous substantive standards” (that is, “general principles of liability”)
and provisions circumscribing the scope of liability along with the financial
61
and temporal parameters of such liability. While these criteria are met by
some of the conventions, this is a far cry from establishing a general regime
of international civil responsibility governing the conduct of NSAs and individuals, be it in relation to primary and/or secondary norms. These questions remain rather academic if states ultimately decline to sign and ratify
the relevant conventions. This does not mention that, if they do enter into
force, the “diffuseness of global environmental problems” and issues related
to causation might pose challenges to establishing liability under these in62
struments.
63
Given my focus in subsequent pages on “terrorism” as a principal case
study and the UNSC as would-be implementer/facilitator of ICIR, I argue
that this body can set specific obligations (that is, primary norms) incumbent upon NSAs. In fact, the UNSC imposed many of the relevant primary
obligations (that is, prohibition of conduct amounting to “terrorism” or lending material support to “terrorism”), thereby prompting an assessment of its
practice and role in ICIR implementation. After all, the Kosovo Advisory
Opinion indicated that the UNSC may promulgate legal obligations that
64
bind nonstate subjects.
59.
See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 324–25 (adding that, under the International
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea and its Protocol, “the relationships between the
person causing the damage and the victims of the damage are essentially placed under the
domain of national laws of one of the contracting parties, save for the specific rules established under the convention which have become an integral part of national laws.”). See also
PETERS, supra note 3, at 156–57.
60.
PETERS, supra note 3, at 155–60 (analyzing the relevant provisions of several conventions and their protocols).
61.
Id. At 158 (adding that the “conventions would also have to contain clearly specified minimum standards governing the forum, standing, the applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.”).
62.
Id. at 161. On causation and related matters, see also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
63.
The present account does not purport to advance a categorical position on the definitional polemic surrounding the concept of “terrorism.” It loosely proceeds from the expansive working definition provided in S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004).
64.
See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶¶ 115–17 (July 22); see
also PETERS, supra note 3, at 96–98 (concluding that this precedent confirms that the UNSC
“unambiguously impose[s] strict legal obligations on private actors in situations of non-

232

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 40:215

It is also apparent from several resolutions that the UNSC itself considers that its pronouncements (and the authorizations it issues for certain actors to engage in certain conduct) might have a law-shaping impact on general international law. The UNSC sometimes confines a given resolution to
the specific matter under study and expressly states that it “shall not be considered as establishing customary international law” (nor as affect65
ing/modifying the addressees’ existing legal rights and obligations). A contrario, this implies that, absent this proviso, a UNSC resolution might have
66
lawmaking features in certain instances. For example, the Council expressly precludes broader lawmaking implications in a series of resolutions regu67
lating piracy off the coast of Somalia. It also included near-identical disclaimers in resolutions targeting Libya on the issues of illicit export of crude
68
69
oil and migrant smuggling and human trafficking. This is not to mention
that several international courts and international law institutions recognize
the UNSC’s ability to contribute to customary international law, including
70
the ICJ, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
71
72
(“ICTY”), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ILC in its

international armed conflict.”) (emphasis in original); Gleider I. Hernández, Non-State Actors
from the Perspective of the International Court of Justice, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 145.
65.
See also Gregory H. Fox et al., The Contributions of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions to the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence of Customary International Law, 67 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 649, 656 (2018).
66.
See id.
67.
See S.C. Res. 2184, ¶ 14 (Nov. 12, 2014); S.C. Res. 2182, ¶ 21 (Oct. 24, 2014);
S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 13 (Nov. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2020, ¶
10 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 1950, ¶ 8 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 2009);
S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 10 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 11 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 8
(Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 9 (June 2, 2008). On Resolution 1816’s wording, see Stephen D. Mathias, The Work of the International Law Commission on Identification of Customary International Law: A View from the Perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs, 15
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 27 (2016).
68.
S.C. Res. 2146, ¶ 9 (Mar. 19, 2014).
69.
S.C. Res. 2240, ¶ 11 (Oct. 9, 2015).
70.
See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 81 (July 22). See generally Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–80 (2005).
71.
Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995).
72.
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2006).
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work on SR, and the International Committee of the Red Cross
74
(“ICRC”).
In summary, the rising importance of individuals and NSAs on the international plane has increased the need for alternate modes of liability beyond classic criminal responsibility. The picture that emerges is one where
some key building blocks of a general ICIR regime are already in place, but
where uncertainty persists. This uncertainty is particularly acute in respect
of the origin and content of relevant primary norms and the mechanics surrounding the application of secondary remedial norms. In developing a
would-be ICIR regime, steadier conceptual and theoretical foundations must
be articulated. In this regard, the law of SR offers a mixed bag of analogical
tools. On one hand, its principal aims and rationales could be adjusted accordingly and transposed to the realm of individuals and NSAs and yield
effective results. On the other hand, that normative scheme is of limited utility given the qualitatively different legal personality of NSAs, the peculiarities related to the abstract construct of the state, and the unique features of
enforcement measures between sovereign states. New directions and solutions must be sought, including through the UNSC as argued in the present
account.

B. Regime Interaction and the UNSC’s Role
International individual responsibility is of vital and topical importance,
especially given the rapid expansion of certain subversive nonstate armed
75
entities and the emergence of equally subversive individuals. Groups like
Daesh/ISIL, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram wield almost state-like power
and control over both territory and populations in certain areas. These
groups perpetrate various international law violations, largely with impunity
and with no functional territorial state on which responsibility can be
pinned. In large territorial swathes of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, and So-

See the ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 28, at 53, 89, 92–93, 114–15, 132.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 39 n.13, 94 n.97, 100 n. 139, 107 nn.14 & 17,
109 n.24, 111 n.40, 113 nn.6–8, 137 n.60, 147 n.25, 184 n.79, 188 n.22, 195–96 nn.70–73,
198 n.87, 199 n.98, 201 nn.105–07 (2005).
75.
A related area—falling within a broader research and policy program on international civil individual responsibility (“ICIR”)—might presumably include the individual civil
liability of state officials. As Lauterpacht cautioned, the international legal system might be
doomed should an individual, acting in an official state capacity (that is, as an organ), be permitted to violate international law in that capacity but ultimately eschew liability by seeking
refuge behind the artificial construct of the “state.” See Hersch Lauterpacht, Règles Générales
du Droit de la Paix, 62 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 297 (1937). While there might be both sound
policy and legal bases for envisaging civil liability of state officials, the reality is that states
are generally reluctant to accept such a prospect. For one application, see Bardo Fassbender,
Can Victims Sue State Officials for Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 347, 369 (2008) (declaring that the “advanced process of ‘humanization’ of international law would surely suggest
such a liability. [But that] so far States have not been ready to agree on it.”).
73.
74.
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malia, for example, the host state has been eviscerated of its effective control over the relevant region, which has been appropriated by extremist
76
groups.
Consequently, individual accountability regimes must enhance their
ability to combat impunity. This is a challenging task. We are often dealing
with irregulars who cannot be swayed by the prospect of deterrence or convinced of the value of reciprocity and proportionality (should those principles be applied in irregular combat). In many cases, long gone are the days
of “clean” theaters of war; asymmetric warfare and all its attendant legal
77
complexities are increasingly prevalent. It is messy, murky terrain, and the
evolving international legal framework to address these challenges—if it
exists—also mirrors this general impression.
The rules of the game are changing in areas highly relevant to NSA
conduct, such as HR. The discourse is “therefore moving away from the traditional view that under [HR] law the individuals hold the rights while only
78
states bear the obligations.” In fact, this shift is part and parcel of a broader
recognition of the individual’s (and NSAs’) situation as international law
79
subjects beyond the traditional paradigm. Indeed, the LaGrand Case
(Germany v. United States of America) confirmed that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations not only enshrines states’ rights pertaining to

76.
However, despite this lack of control by the territorial state, the UNSC remains resolute in emphasizing the state’s counterterrorism and related capacity-building obligations.
For example, after condemning recent terrorist attacks in Mogadishu orchestrated by AlShabaab and the presence in Somalia of groups affiliated with Daesh/ISIL, it called upon the
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia to continue “strengthen[ing] Somalia’s capacity to prevent
and counter terrorism, consistent with its international obligations, relevant Security Council
resolutions and implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy . . . .” S.C. Res. 2408, ¶
7 (Mar. 27, 2018); see also S.C. Res. 2344, ¶ 19 (Mar. 17, 2017) (emphasizing similar obligations for Afghanistan). Some might also lump organizations like Hamas into the same category, while others might equate Hamas with a state actor. For one view, see Amnon Aran, Containment and Territorial Transnational Actors: Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas, 88 INT’L AFF.
835, 854 (2012).
77.
See WILLIAM BANKS, COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (2013); PAULINE M. KAURIN, THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS
AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYMMETRICAL 7–8 (2014); MAX G.
MANWARING, THE COMPLEXITY OF MODERN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 3 (2012); NEW
BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 8 (William C.
Banks ed., 2011).
78.
Eric de Brabandere, Non-State Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2009). Over two decades ago, Thomas Franck already
identified the inversely proportional relationship between individuals’ HR and their obligations/potential legal accountability. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS 264 (1998).
79.
See Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 318–19; PETERS, supra note 3, at 152–66. But cf.
Jean d’Aspremont, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism: The Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 25.
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consular relations but also that Article 36(1)(b) “creates individual rights,
which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in
80
this Court by the national State of the detained person.” Further, the Court
was careful not to qualify those rights as HR, arguably signaling a departure
from the traditional posture regarding the individual’s situation as an international law subject. In fact, the ICJ expressly declined to consider Germany’s additional argument that the relevant right “was not only an individual
81
right but has today assumed the character of a human right.”
Similarly, the ILC echoed the ICJ’s conclusion that individuals (and
other NSAs) can obtain enforceable rights in the international legal order
while firmly stating that they can also assume international legal obligations. In the context of the responsibility of international organizations, the
ILC Special Rapporteur construed this precedent as the “[t]he Court
82
stat[ing] . . . that individuals are also subjects of international law.” This
prompted the Rapporteur to ponder that “[i]t would be difficult to understand why individuals may acquire rights and obligations under international law while the same could not occur with any international organization,
83
provided that it is an entity which is distinct from its members.” Consequently, Professor Gaja opined that this approach double-coated the protection afforded individuals under international law. Such individuals would
benefit from their home state’s exercise of diplomatic protection or some
other interstate claim while again enjoying protection where a “treaty pro84
vides for remedies that are directly actionable by individuals . . . .” On one
view of the LaGrand precedent, it is significant that the Court declined to
frame the individuals’ rights as HR. If individuals can have enforceable
rights beyond HR, the argument presumably goes, individuals and/or other
NSAs should be able to assume obligations beyond the traditional criminal
prohibitions and “core” international crimes (for example, crimes against
80.
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 77 (June 27) (emphasis
added).
81.
Id. ¶ 78; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Cristina Hoss, LaGrand Case (Germany v
United States of America), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶¶ 16–19, 33–36 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (underscoring that LaGrand “also gained some
prominence for having raised the issue of individual rights flowing from the [Convention].”).
For a critical take on its aftermath, see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in
the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 427, 427 (2002). In a subsequent, factually similar case, the Court emphasized the “interdependence of the rights of the
State and of individual rights” in this context, underscoring that the applicant state could, “in
submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which
it claim[ed] to have suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights conferred on [its] nationals under the [Convention].” Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 40 (Mar. 31).
82.
Giorgio Gaja (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532 (Mar. 26, 2003).
83.
Id.; see also Clapham, supra note 24, at 28.
84.
Giorgio Gaja, The Position of Individuals in International Law: An ILC Perspective, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 11, 14 (2010).
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humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression), the violation of which
85
could engage ICIR.
This proposition also aligns with recent scholarly proposals to reconceptualize the frame of reference concerning the individual’s role and place
in international law, steering the inquiry away from exclusive focus on HR
as the “central and entirely undisputed element of the international legal sta86
tus of the individual.” The next logical step in this thinking is to
acknowledge that NSAs’ assumption of primary (substantive) obligations
would be rendered meaningless absent their (potential and actual) enforcement through secondary norms. In summary, when the abovementioned
85.
See also Clapham, supra note 24, at 30. This line of argument must be appreciated
with caution, as illustrated by the challenging history of corporate liability for HR violations.
Given the considerable resistance against, and concerns voiced over, adopting a more robust
liability regime to address corporations’ HR abuses, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and HR John Ruggie ultimately opted for a more measured and
grounded position. Consequently, the resulting document, which uses hortatory language in
relevant parts, speaks solely of the “responsibility of business enterprises to respect [HR]” as
opposed to couching the language in mandatory legal terms. See U.N. Human Rights Office of
the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04, at 13–26 (June 16, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (especially Principle 23). In fairness, the document
and its commentary, id. at 10, invites states to explore adopting corporate civil liability mechanisms for HR violations, recognizes, id. at 14, that the issues of legal responsibility and enforcement “remain defined largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions,” some
of which provide for civil actions for corporations’ complicity in HR violations, id. at 19, and
encourages, id. at 25, corporations to treat the risk of being found complicit in such violations
“as a legal compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate legal liability
arising from extraterritorial civil claims.” Id. at 26. The document also stresses that “corporate
directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual liability for acts that amount to
gross [HR] abuses” and, in various parts, maps out the HR “due diligence” that business enterprises should conduct. See id. at 15–26.
For different views on this project and its implications, see JOHN RUGGIE, JUST
BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); Susan Ariel
Aaronson & Ian Higham, “Re-Righting Business”: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop
International Human Rights Standards for Transnational Firms, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 333 (2013);
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Rejoinder to John Gerard Ruggie and
John F. Sherman, III, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 929 (2017); Carola Glinski, The Ruggie Framework,
Business Human Rights Self-Regulation and Tort Law: Increasing Standards Through Mutual
Impact and Learning, 35 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 15 (2017); Carlos López, The “Ruggie Process”: From Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 58
(Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013); John Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: The
UN Framework for Business and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 519 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010); John Ruggie & John Sherman, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 92 (2017); THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (Radu Mares ed.,
2012). But see infra note 297.
86.
PETERS, supra note 3, at 32.
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principled argument and precedent argument are appreciated in tandem,
those actors’ international legal personality—however limited—cannot be
dissociated from the prospect of international individual responsibility beyond strict criminal liability. If accepted, this conclusion would considerably facilitate the transition of the individual into a key subject of interna87
tional law.
As shown in Part III, the UNSC recently shifted away from requiring
that states regulate the conduct of NSAs and individuals themselves—for
example, by implementing legislation, exercising jurisdiction over criminals, punishing unlawful behavior, etc.—thereby initially only indirectly or
implicitly regulating and binding NSAs. The UNSC moved to directly regulating the conduct of NSAs in its resolutions. Coupled with scholarly attempts to situate the role and place of NSAs and individuals as both holders
88
of rights and bearers of obligations on the international plane, these developments not only suggest their increasing importance in this context but also a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and extent of their interna89
tional legal personality.
Before addressing the UNSC’s potential contribution, creative solutions
to palliate SR’s failures to properly capture the role of individuals (that is,
its inherent bilateral/state-centric inclination) warrant mention. In other
words, reconceptualizing or enhancing SR or imposing more onerous due
diligence obligations on states across the board as the sole strategy is an inadequate and overly statist approach. It fails to recognize the shift of power
away from nation-states in many contexts. As a corollary, the international
87.
See generally id. at 21–34, 165 (also observing that the imposition of secondary
obligations upon individuals would entail their duty to compensate victims for international
law violations). This line of argument aligns with the view that the “present era – which is
often perceived as a period of crisis in positive international law – has seen a renaissance of
natural law, in which the individual is celebrated as the ‘true subject’ of international law.”
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). It is also compatible with several scholarly pronouncements
on the importance of the international legal personality of the individual. See, e.g., JANNE
ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 473 (2004); Antônio Augusto
Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium, 316
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 33–34, 57, 147, 252, 265–267, 274, 282 (2005); see also RAFAEL
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 124–26 (2010); ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2–3 (2010).
88.
See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 152–66; PARLETT, supra note 24; PARTICIPANTS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11; Clapham, supra note 24.
89.
For a recent provocative treatment, see ASTRID KJELDGAARD-PEDERSEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL (2018). For more classical treatments, compare David Feldman, International Personality, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS 343, 359
(1985) (arguing that the ability to hold rights in international law constitutes a sufficient predicate for international legal personality), with Prosper Weil, Le Droit International en Quête
de son Identité: Cours Général de Droit International Public, 237 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 122
(1992) (expounding that international legal personality must be premised on lawmaking and
law enforcement powers).
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community’s excessive focus on individual criminal responsibility is equally problematic. Contemporaneous events suggest that nonstate groups and
entities, as opposed to individuals, are securing and consolidating that pow90
er. Similarly, Mégret has argued that to enforce obligations erga omnes—
of which some counterterrorism undertakings unquestionably form part—
”[p]erhaps a better ground is the idea that, if crimes are committed by individuals, then other individuals should also be allowed to stop their perpetra91
tion.” This reasoning can also be extended to other NSAs and their subversive activities.
In a different context, the recent saga surrounding the ICJ’s Marshall
Islands cases demonstrated that judicial organ’s inherent structural shortcomings (both jurisdictional and admissibility-based) to deal with multilateral disputes involving alleged violations of interdependent/interrelated ob92
ligations (potentially erga omnes), the violation of which may be
facilitated by state and nonstate actors. For starters, only states can appear
before the ICJ. Individuals and other NSAs do not possess the quality of
sovereignty (or sovereign equality), nor the requisite international legal personality to do so. In relevant state-to-state cases, however, the Court may be
called upon to weigh in on legal issues that also relate to the unlawful acts
of NSAs—sometimes indirectly—as part of the broader factual complex be93
fore it. One first obstacle is that such issues might arise in connection with
complex multilateral disputes over which the Court may decline to exercise
94
95
jurisdiction or reject on the ground of inadmissibility. In such scenarios,
90.
See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265, 306
(2004).
91.
Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Freedom Fighters” and “Terrorists”: When, if Ever, Is
Non-State Violence Legitimate in International Law? 10 n.45 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373590 (also underscoring that “the articles on state
responsibility are really too steeped in inter-state considerations to provide much of a foothold
for a truly erga omnes (i.e.: also encompassing individuals) reaction to fundamental illegality.”).
92.
For a critical account, see Vincent-Joël Proulx, The World Court’s Jurisdictional
Formalism and its Lost Market Share: The Marshall Islands Decisions and the Quest for a
Suitable Dispute Settlement Forum for Multilateral Disputes, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925
(2017).
93.
Despite the Court’s state-centric mode of dispute settlement, which denies individuals and NSAs standing before the Court, the ICJ has nonetheless delivered several key pronouncements dealing with the rights and obligations of NSAs under international law. In addition, the Court has examined wrongful conduct authored by NSAs for the purposes of
determining whether that behavior could be attributed to states for the purpose of establishing
SR. The Court has also weighed in on the rights and obligations of NSAs in advisory proceedings. For a review of relevant jurisprudence, see Hernández, supra note 64, at 140–64.
94.
For optimistic views that the Court can and should accept to adjudicate complex
multilateral disputes, see Béatrice Bonafé, Establishing the Existence of a Dispute Before the
International Court of Justice: Drawbacks and Implications, 45 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 3, 27–28
(2017). Some publicists stress that, by adopting a more procedurally flexible approach, the
Court could avoid undesirable scenarios where access to justice is impeded by judicial formal-
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it is possible that the Court’s predominantly state-centric structure and bilateral process would meet their match, leaving it unable to contribute meaningfully to the development of ICIR (especially when it rejects cases on jurisdictional and/or admissibility grounds).
More importantly, a second challenge would emerge in tandem with the
fact that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction ratione personae over NSAs,
which then begs the question whether the only determinations the Court
could make on ICIR—in strictly interstate disputes—would be done indi96
rectly or by way of “incidental censure.” Irrespective of the answer to this
query, one thing remains clear: the ICJ does not constitute a reliable or even
relevant forum for invoking or establishing the international responsibility
of NSAs, let alone attempting to secure remedies for their international law
breaches. In other words, not every case before the Court will be as straightforward as Belgium v. Senegal from procedural and admissibility stand97
points, nor will every case offer a potential entry-point for considerations
related to international individual responsibility. This partly explains why
this Article’s emphasis is on legal tools the UNSC can use to enhance individual responsibility. While potential ICIR enforcement amongst NSAs
could be explored as a form of “soft law,” with domestic legal regimes and
relevant transnational frameworks remaining the more central players, the
ICJ’s structure, make-up, and recent jurisprudence suggest a decidedly less
relevant model for developing and implementing ICIR.
Thus, this Article’s focus on the UNSC is informed by three additional
rationales. First, scholars have recently examined the UNSC’s role in preventing/suppressing global security threats, with insistence on the subversive activities of NSAs in the framework of states’ obligations. Consequently, the UNSC can play a role, sometimes determinant, in implementing SR
for state failures to prevent terrorism or violations of other important coun98
terterrorism obligations. Indeed, the use of legal rhetoric in UNSC deliberism. See, e.g., Surabhi Ranganathan, Nuclear Weapons and the Court, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 88
(2017); Ingo Venzke, Public Interests in the International Court of Justice–A Comparison
Between Nuclear Arms Race (2016) and South West Africa (1966), 111 AJIL UNBOUND 68
(2017).
95.
On this point, see Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Races and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 833, ¶¶ 33–41 (Oct. 5) (separate opinion by Judge Tomka). See also
Vincent-Joël Proulx, The Marshall Islands Judgments and Multilateral Disputes at the World
Court: Whither Access to International Justice?, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 96, 99–100 (2017).
96.
This expression is borrowed from a different, yet still relevant, context. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Article 39 of the ILC First-Reading Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 747, 765 n.31 (2000); see also Karel Wellens, The
UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 1, 49 (2003).
97.
See infra nn. 114–17 and accompanying text.
INSTITUTIONALIZING STATE
98.
See
generally
VINCENT-JOËL PROULX,
RESPONSIBILITY: UN ORGANS AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2016) [hereinafter PROULX,
INSTITUTIONALIZING]; Vincent-Joël Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution: Enhancing the Securi-
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ations is more commonplace than some might think. Sometimes, international law arguments might have considerable purchase in swaying UNSC
99
decision-making constituencies toward a particular outcome. This account
continues this line of inquiry: this logic—and the UNSC’s occasional use of
international law—could likely enhance ICIR mechanisms.
Second, the impetus toward revisiting individual responsibility mechanisms, beyond international criminal law (“ICL”), stems largely from SR’s
100
failures. The idea of “international responsibility” must be understood
broadly, encompassing various processes, actors, and levels of wrongdoing/accountability. A more comprehensive and effective international responsibility system must increasingly grapple with the involvement of multiple private actors internationally. They operate alongside state and
institutional players, which frequently contribute to shaping legal rapports
and consequences across networks of multi-leveled relationships of responsibility.
One criticism leveled against the ARSIWA is that they fail to consider
the growing importance of NSAs, focusing almost exclusively on “bilat101
eral,” “individualistic,” and “privatistic” conceptions of SR. In some sectors, private actors obviate the need for regulation by self-regulating, for instance by adopting corporate codes of conduct or relying on “soft law”
102
regimes. A case in point is the Montreux Document, which was premised
on a shared understanding that private military and security companies
103
would self-regulate. The flipside is that states should not be able to elude
responsibility or disguise their participation in armed hostilities by hiding

ty Council’s Role in Enforcing Counterterrorism Obligations, 8 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
303 (2017) [hereinafter Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution].
99.
See IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2011) (especially chapters 5 and 8) [hereinafter JOHNSTONE,
THE POWER]; Ian Johnstone, Legal Deliberation and Argumentation in International Decision-Making, in THE FAULT LINES OF LEGITIMACY 175 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc
Coicaud eds., 2010); Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better
Argument, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437 (2003); Ian Johnstone, The Security Council and International Law, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 771 (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al. eds., 2016).
100.
See THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13.
101.
See generally Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, The Marginal Role of the Individual in
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, 15 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 39 (2004).
102.
On “soft law” mechanisms, see Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 327–28. Moreover,
reliance on “soft law” mechanisms might prove problematic in some instances as the underlying norms might be perceived as imprecise or non-binding. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422
(2000); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
581 (2005).
103.
See Letter Dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland
to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Sept. 17,
2008).
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104

behind private military firms. Perhaps counterintuitively, “soft law” instruments promulgated by international organizations might in fact “generate as much or sometimes greater compliance than formally binding sources
of international obligation like treaties,” even though it remains unclear
105
whether their violation amounts to an internationally wrongful act.
Third, if we are truly to rethink individual responsibility outside the
box, then regime interaction will be central in that inquiry. Individual responsibility often crops up in factually complex scenarios. In any given
case, such responsibility might arise through a multi-leveled process involving multiple actors and different decisionmakers, including the ICJ and
UNSC (that is, a network of multi-leveled relationships of responsibility).
Consequently, different legal regimes (such as ICIR, ICL, HR, IHL, and
SR) might be superimposed, intersect, or interact. An obvious interaction
106
might happen between individual responsibility and SR, as there is nothing precluding SR from applying coextensively with individual responsibil107
ity schemes. However, the ICJ emphasized that individual criminal responsibility and SR constitute distinct legal schemes and pursue different

104.
See Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of
Private Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 239, 258 (2009).
105.
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 351, 359 (2017) (also arguing that international law generated by international organizations exists along a continuum of bindingness, thereby eluding the classical
positivist tendency to search for an “ ‘on/off’ switch where something is or isn’t law,”); see
also Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
106.
This sometimes entails complementarity between SR and international (criminal)
individual responsibility. See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Complementarity Between
State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: The
Crime of State Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF OSCAR SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 259. On the interplay between SR and individual
responsibility, see BÉATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the
State, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
1085–99 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Hazel Fox, The International Court of Justice’s
Treatment of Acts of the State and in Particular the Attribution of Acts of Individuals to the
States, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 147 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002); Nollkaemper, supra note 2, at 615–40; Marina Spinedi, State Responsibility v. Individual Responsibility for International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 895 (2002); Andreas Zimmermann, Comment: Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
International Criminal Law and Human Rights Law – Synergy and Conflict?, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 215 (Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
107.
See George T. Yates, III, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in
the Postwar Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 213 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983).
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aims. A finding of responsibility under one regime does not necessarily en108
tail the same conclusion under the other.
Sometimes, the same factual complex will involve wrongful conduct by
different actors, be they states, individuals, or nonstate entities (for example,
organizations or corporations), which can lead to shared responsibility between actors for the same wrongful act or for a series of interrelated wrong109
ful acts. In the counterterrorism context, a single terrorist strike can be facilitated by multiple state failures to thwart preparatory acts spanning
several territories. The consequences of such attack may be exacerbated by
state complacency or failure to act on intelligence reports. Different individuals and/or entities may have funded that terrorist enterprise. Other
groups or individuals may have trained the operatives involved in the terrorist excursion. Different individuals or entities may have provided valuable
logistical assistance, for example by forging documents or offering travel
assistance. This is not to mention the actual underlying terrorist act(s) carried out by NSAs during the strike. Ultimately, a complex web of wrongdoing and multi-leveled relationships emerges: what role and to what degree
will “individual responsibility” be brought to bear on this chain of events?
This inquiry will invariably involve difficult determinations related to evidence, causation, the apportionment of liability, standing, and enforce110
ment/implementation of responsibility.

108.
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 127–29 (Feb. 3). On its implications and related questions, see Beatrice I. Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 SEQÜÊNCIA 19 (2016). For a critical take on this type of reasoning in a
different, but related, case, see Antonio Cassese, A Judicial Massacre (Feb 27, 2007 2:50
PM),
GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/27/
thejudicialmassacreofsrebr.
109.
“Shared” international responsibility and related questions have received considerable academic coverage. See DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2015); PRINCIPLES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN APPRAISAL OF THE STATE OF THE ART (André Nollkaemper &
Ilias Plakokefalos eds., 2014); Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between NonState Actors and States in International Law: Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49
(2015); André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359 (2013). On shared responsibility and nonstate terrorists, see Kimberley N. Trapp, Shared Responsibility and Non-State Terrorist Actors, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 141 (2015).
110.
See generally Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 240, 258–59 (June 26); André Nollkaemper, Introduction: Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in International Adjudication, 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 277 (2013); André Nollkaemper, Issues of Shared Responsibility Before the International Court of Justice, in EVOLVING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Eva
Rieter & Henri de Waele eds., 2012); John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility
and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 225 (1988). On the challenges posed by causation under SR, see Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L.
471 (2015). See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 166 (highlighting difficulties in defining the
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The key takeaway is that international individual responsibility—
especially when envisaged beyond the traditional “criminal” paradigm—
will often arise in combination with other levels of responsibility. Let us review two brief examples. Following the Lockerbie incident, Libya’s SR was
bound up with the actual perpetrators’ individual responsibility for the airplane bombing, which ultimately facilitated investigation and prosecution
by domestic institutions. Consequently, the UNSC dealt with Libya’s SR, as
advocated by France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, while the
ICJ was seized of the disputes over the culprits’ potential extradition under
the Montreal Convention. In the end, the UNSC held Libya internationally
responsible, but not without some ambiguity surrounding attribution stand111
ards. The ICJ never had the opportunity to rule on the merits of the disputes submitted to it in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
112
(Libya v. United Kingdom) (Libya v. United States).
The Lockerbie disputes were state-to-state, handled by different UN organs. However, underlying these disagreements was the individual responsibility of the persons who committed the wrongful act (the Lockerbie
bombing), which arose concomitantly with the processes described previously. It was only years later that suspicion arose that the bombing was directly ordered by Libya’s political leadership. Almost a decade earlier, the
finding of individual responsibility facilitated (or catalyzed) Libya’s acceptance of its “civil” responsibility for the incident, given that “a credible
judicial determination of the guilt of a Libyan secret service agent removed
the element of deniability, and is likely to have encouraged acceptance of
113
the obligation to make reparation on that basis.”
legal regime governing “parallel responsibility” for international law breaches existing simultaneously between state actors and individuals).
111.
For a full-fledged discussion of this precedent, see PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING,
supra note 98, §§ 2.4.2, 3.1.5.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.2, 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.4.9, 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and
4.6.1.
112.
The Court also dealt with requests for provisional measures in both cases. See
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 3
(Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J.
Rep. 114 (Apr. 14). During that phase of the proceedings, the ICJ rejected the argument that
Libya was stripped of the exercise of its rights under the Montreal Convention, alleged on the
ground that the UNSC was seized of a related matter and imposed certain obligations upon
that state. Central was the fact that the Court had taken jurisdiction before the UNSC issued
the relevant resolutions. See Libya v. U.S. ¶¶ 38, 44; see also Andreas L. Paulus, Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: Lockerbie Cases, Preliminary Objections, 9 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 550 (1998); Pieter H.F. Bekker, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) and (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary
Objections, Judgements, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 503 (1998).
113.
TRAPP, supra note 23, at 236. For details on the criminal conviction and the relevant individual’s subsequent release to Libya on compassionate grounds, see id. at 236 n.33.
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Another example arose in the Belgium v. Senegal case. Here, the ICJ
was confronted, inter alia, with Senegal’s failure to comply with the obligation to extradite or prosecute under the UNCAT regarding Mr. Hissène Habré, the former Chadian leader who orchestrated and directed various HR
114
abuses, including acts of torture, during a specific time period. When an
individual who violated the Convention is located on its territory, Article
7(1) requires each party to, “if it does not extradite him, submit the case to
115
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” This litigation
raised a series of interesting questions, including whether Senegal would
have fulfilled its obligation had it referred the case to the ICC. Otherwise
put, did the “prosecute” component of the aut dedere aut judicare duty (the
obligation to extradite or prosecute) necessarily mean domestic prosecution?
In this instance, Senegal did not submit the case to the ICC by the time the
ICJ heard the dispute, and it created numerous delays in bringing the matter
forward in its own jurisdiction. Granted, a plain reading of the Convention
might suggest that Senegal was expected to submit the case to its own authorities for the purposes of domestic criminal prosecution (though, as
shown below, the outcome reached was not purely “domestic”).
Unsurprisingly, the Court found that Senegal violated its obligation by
failing to submit the case to its competent authorities for criminal prosecution, stressing that it had to, “without further delay,” comply with this du116
ty. Mr. Habré was ultimately tried and convicted in Senegal following
many delays. He was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity
by the Extraordinary African Chambers, a court instituted by the African
117
Union and Senegal. This precedent shows that establishing individual responsibility is typically tied to or facilitated by the prior establishment of
SR, or at least by the intercession of an authoritative decisionmaker outside
the strict realm of individual criminal responsibility judicial decisionmaking.
Here, it so happened to be the ICJ, but the UNSC can also be relevant in
this regard. The Court’s settlement of the interstate dispute helped incentivize Senegal to forge ahead with the prosecution, ultimately resulting in a
formal judicial finding of individual responsibility. This regime interaction
On Libya’s acceptance of responsibility, see S.C. Res. 1506, at pmbl. (Sept. 12, 2003); Letter
Dated 15 August 2003 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya to the U.N. Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/818 (Aug. 15, 2003).
114.
For commentary, see André Nollkaemper, Wither Aut Dedere? The Obligation to
Extradite or Prosecute After the ICJ’s Judgment in Belgium v. Senegal, 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 501 (2013).
115.
UNCAT, supra note 33, art. 7, ¶ 1.
116.
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Merits, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, ¶ 122(6) (July 20).
117.
See Ruth Maclean, Chad’s Hissène Habré Found Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/
chad-hissene-habre-guilty-crimes-against-humanity-senegal.
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and mutual reinforcement of different responsibility-seeking processes also
works the other way, namely, where a prior finding of individual criminal
responsibility can inform a court’s analysis on a SR claim related to the
same underlying facts, albeit transposed to the interstate level. For example,
the ICJ’s Bosnian Genocide and Croatia v. Serbia decisions, both dealing
with alleged violations of the Genocide Convention, drew considerable inspiration from the factual findings on individual responsibility formulated
118
by the ICTY.
Any project aiming to expand the scope of individual/international responsibility—and to presumably enhance accountability and reduce impunity—must acknowledge that establishing individual responsibility will sometimes be dependent on a multiplicity of (sometimes mutually reinforcing)
legal and political processes, involving various actors. This includes a role
for the UNSC. Recent developments support the need for alternate modes of
liability in international law, beyond criminal responsibility. They indicate a
shift toward the gradual recognition that individuals and NSAs can assume
direct legal obligations under international law, of an increasing variety.
This conclusion raises the related question of how those obligations are to
be implemented and enforced. Conventional wisdom dictates that the traditional enforcement mechanisms to implement obligations between sovereign states, be they legal, judicial, diplomatic or political, have little to contribute to this debate in terms of being the sole implementers of ICIR. In
combination with other transnational/domestic legal and political processes,
actors, and institutions, however, they may become effective means to establish and implement ICIR. This approach might go a long way in palliating some of the normative and enforcement voids described earlier.
As shown below, the UNSC disposes of some tools to bolster efforts
toward fulfilling these objectives within a broader framework of concurrent
legal regimes and institutions. Particularly valuable are the UNSC’s potential and actual contributions in formulating primary obligations incumbent
upon individuals and NSAs. In a recent resolution addressing terrorism in
Somalia, the Council reiterated its oft-repeated call to combat terrorism by
119
“all means . . . . .” It then specifically subsumed “international law” within
those means, including international human rights law, refugee law, and
120
IHL, but not limiting its approach to those facets of international law. This
posture suggests two key developments. First, the UNSC can play a role in
developing international legal standards, particularly but not exclusively in

118.
See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 3); Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶¶ 278–376, (Feb. 26) (especially at
¶ 297) (finding that a genocide, within the meaning of the Convention, was perpetrated at Srebrenica).
119.
S.C. Res. 2444, at pmbl. (Nov. 14, 2018).
120.
Id.
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the field of counterterrorism. Second, it follows logically from that power
that the Council can also play a role in enforcing and implementing those
standards and other extant international law duties in apposite scenarios.
More broadly, recent developments highlight the variety of legal obligations
individuals and NSAs assume under international law, extending beyond the
121
familiar HR and IHL commitments. Thus, it is now up to scholars and
policy-makers to identify meaningful and effective enforcement mechanisms for such obligations.

III. The UNSC as Legislator:
Impact on Individual Responsibility
Since 9/11, the UNSC has been a central force in driving counterterrorism agendas to enhance individual responsibility, including setting up a
122
novel security apparatus like the Counter-Terrorism Committee (“CTC”)
and further developing the “targeted” or “smart” sanctions regime. Indeed,
the “targeted” sanctions regime has come under increasing scrutiny in recent
123
years and generated considerable legal and policy debate. While the
“smart sanctions” regime has some relevance for ICIR, this Article attempts
to identify other modes and spaces for individual accountability. In other
words, it seeks to offer a complementary understanding of other international individual responsibility mechanisms to remedy the dearth in scholarship.
In so doing, it advocates a central role for a UNSC-driven general responsibility model to be considered alongside the UN “targeted sanctions” model.
That said, the “targeted” sanctions regime remains important in articulating
the foundations of a general ICIR regime, given that the UNSC sanctions
committees hand down decisions that are directly binding on individuals.
For example, the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee designated
124
individuals in fulfilling its mandate.

121.
See also supra nn. 54–62 and accompanying text.
122.
On the creation of the CTC, see Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 333
(2003). For a recent CTC-related resolution, see S.C. Res. 2395 (Dec. 21, 2017).
123.
A full review of its implications has been carried out elsewhere, resulting in a rich
literature. See generally Lisa Ginsborg, The United Nations Security Council’s CounterTerrorism Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 608 (Ben Saul ed., 2014).
More broadly, see Kristen E. Boon, U.N. Sanctions as Regulation, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 543
(2016). The “targeted sanctions” regime has also raised important questions regarding UNSC
accountability and transparency, as seen in DEVIKA HOVELL, THE POWER OF PROCESS: THE
VALUE OF DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS DECISION-MAKING (2016); Larissa van den Herik, Peripheral Hegemony in the Quest to Ensure Security Council Accountability for Its Individualized UN Sanctions Regime, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 427 (2014);
Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2016).
124.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c) (Dec. 19, 2000); see also PETERS, supra note 3, at
95. On the Committee’s listing and delisting processes, along with its background and proce-

Winter 2019]

International Civil Individual Responsibility

247

A. The UNSC’s “Quasi-Legislative” Excursions
From a “quasi-legislative” standpoint, the UNSC formulated several
primary legal norms, the observance of which concerns both states and
NSAs and the violation of which could trigger both SR and ICIR. The
UNSC’s most important initial contribution stemmed from Resolution 1373,
which instituted the CTC. That landmark document is widely perceived as a
prime example of the Council “legislating” relevant primary counterterror125
ism norms for both NSAs and states. From a broader systemic perspective, this UNSC lawmaking foray corresponds to a “legislative” trend associated with international organizations generally. This precedent and other
similar subsequent overtures by the Council have also been specifically
equated with a UNSC-driven “legislative” trend, especially in counterterror126
ism contexts.
Resolution 1373 primarily addressed states by universalizing certain obligations pertaining to terrorist financing and its criminalization, requiring
the criminalization of other terrorism-related offenses in states’ legal systems, and prohibiting the direct/indirect support of terrorism. While this
127
document requires states to monitor and regulate NSA conduct, it does not
expressly address the potential responsibility of NSAs. Therefore, the violation of its prescriptions might be more relevant to SR deployment in the
event of a breach.

dure, see Sanctions List Materials, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
125.
Although, in fairness, the resolution’s principal addressees are states. See BARDO
FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 96–97 (2009). More generally, see also José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874 n.7 (2003).
126.
ALVAREZ, supra note 105, at 116–27 (reviewing relevant counterterrorism resolutions as a manifestation of global “legislation”); see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 195–217 (2005); JOHNSTONE, THE POWER, supra note 99,
at 93–105; Alan Boyle, International Lawmaking: Towards a New Role for the Security
Council?, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172, 178–80 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012); Ian Johnstone, Law-Making by International Organizations: Perspectives from IL/IR Theory, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 266, 272–73 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities
of International Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87 (2008); Ian Johnstone, The
Security Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 80, 80–82, 90 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008); Paul C.
Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901–05 (2002); Stefan
Talmon, Note and Comment, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
175, 175–78 (2005).
127.
For some, Resolution 1373 “might be seen as approval of an expanded theory of
state responsibility attributing the behavior of non-state terrorists to a state that knowingly
‘harbors’ terrorists and does not take action to prevent further terrorist attacks.” E.g., J. Patrick
Kelly, The International Law of Force and the Fight Against Terrorism, DEL. LAW., Summer
2003, at 18, 19.
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The resolution’s putative state centrism might be explained by its general legislative tenor and the fact that it did not fix any applicable geographical or temporal limits to its application. It was adopted “in a general context
not directly related to disciplining any individual country or particular non128
state actor.” However, the underlying obligations incumbent upon NSAs
are implicit and flow from the wording of the document, especially when
coupled with other landmark documents and the slew of subsequent thematic and specific counterterrorism resolutions. Furthermore, there is validity to
the idea that, in many instances, UNSC resolutions govern the conduct of
NSAs, at least indirectly, by requiring states to regulate and counteract the
129
unlawful actions of nonstate entities and individuals. A clear example of
such UNSC action is evidenced by several resolutions obligating states to
130
adopt various measures against terrorist groups and individuals. Another
illustration of this practice resides in the UNSC’s creation of various
“smart” sanctions regimes, over twenty-five since the end of the Cold War.
They aim to constrict—with the support of national legislations and institutions—the movements and capacity of subversive groups and individuals
through, inter alia, “financial sanctions, travel bans, commodity trade re131
strictions and sectoral economic means.” Admittedly, this exercise of
UNSC functions aligns more squarely with the objective of implementing
individual responsibility, although such use of its powers remains intimately
tied to UNSC “quasi-legislation.” More importantly, construing such UNSC
measures as “indirect” regulation of NSAs might rest on an artificial distinction with “direct” regulation, especially since “these sanctions are triggered
132
by and designed to reverse acts of non-state entities.” Nevertheless, in
other instances, the UNSC directly and unequivocally regulates NSAs themselves without directing states or institutional actors to mediate or facilitate
133
its prescriptions.
128.
Emilio J. Cárdenas, The United Nations Security Council’s Quest for Effectiveness,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1341, 1341 (2004).
129.
See 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 800–02 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Fox et al., supra note 65, at 700.
130.
See Resolutions, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE,
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/security-council/resolutions/ (last visited March 17,
2019).
131.
Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen, Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed
Conflicts: First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda, 91 INT’L AFF. 1387, 1388 (2015); see
also Boon, supra note 123, at 560–61.
132.
Fox et al., supra note 65, at 700 (observing that “the indirect nature of the punitive
measures is not a meaningful distinction from direct measures.”).
133.
International Law Association Non State Actor Committee Washington Conference, Third Report Prepared by the Co-Rapporteurs, Cedric Ryngaert and Jean d’Aspremont,
6–7 (2014) (remarking that the UNSC has required NSAs to observe HR duties); Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354–355 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (suggesting that imposing obligations upon NSAs must be justified); P.H. Kooijmans, The Security Council and
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In the same vein, the UNSC subsequently arrogated further lawmaking
powers and extended its coverage of terrorism-related prescriptions to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, this time clearly carving out obligations for NSAs. It emphasized the clear nexus between its counterterrorism
resolution-making and NSAs’ potential individual responsibility. In Resolution 1540’s preamble, adopted unanimously, the UNSC stated that it was
[g]ravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that nonState actors such as those identified in the [UN] list established and
maintained by the Committee established under [UNSC] resolution
1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
134
and their means of delivery . . . .
Moreover, the UNSC defined the term “[n]on-State actor” as an “individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in con135
ducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.” In the
operative part adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC decided—presumably still assuming that the underlying prohibited conduct
could trigger individual responsibility—that “all States shall refrain from
providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
136
biological weapons and their means of delivery . . . .” It further decided
that all States shall, “in accordance with their national procedures, . . . adopt
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor”
137
to pursue the aims enumerated above.
This last obligation was reiterated by the Council in a subsequent reso138
lution, which also reemphasizes much of Resolution 1540’s content. This
development is significant because it takes the Council’s rhetoric and
measures outside of the familiar fields of IHL and HR, expanding its regula-

Non-State Entities as Parties to Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 333, 333–46 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998); see also infra Part IV.
134.
S.C. Res. 1540, at pmbl. (Apr. 28, 2004) (italicization in original). The UNSC has
also issued directions to prevent nonstate terrorist actors from acquiring other types of weaponry. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2370 ¶¶ 7, 9, 13 (Aug. 2, 2017). But see PETERS, supra note 3, at
93–94.
135.
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 134, at pmbl.
136.
Id. ¶ 1.
137.
Id. ¶ 2; see also Daniel H. Joyner, The Security Council as Legal Hegemon, 43
GEO. J. INT’L L. 225, 227–38 (2012); Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, If Awkward Exercise in International Law Making: Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 411,
429–34 (2004).
138.
See S.C. Res. 2325, ¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2016). On the UNSC’s broader role in reducing
proliferation by NSAs, see Marco Pedrazzi, The Role of the Security Council in the Framework of International Efforts to Fight Proliferation by Non-State Actors, in NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 179 (Ida Caracciolo et al.
eds., 2016).
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tory scope to a range of prohibited activities connected, inter alia, to the
manufacturing, transmission, sale, and movement of harmful chemical, biological, and nuclear materials. These developments, paired with the UNSC’s
regulation of terrorist NSAs described below, signal that the Council’s formulation of international obligations can also be envisaged outside the welltrodden paths of its past lawmaking on HR and humanitarian matters. Surely, this manifestation of power confirms that the Council might contribute to
enhancing individual responsibility frameworks on a predominantly civil
plane.

B. The UNSC’s Direct Move Toward Regulating Nonstate Actors
The UNSC recently “legislated” to regulate directly the conduct of individuals attempting to travel abroad to receive terrorist training or join the
ranks of terrorist organizations, particularly singling out Al Qaeda,
139
Daesh/ISIL, and the Al-Nusra Front (“ANF”) in Syria and Iraq. When
compared to the practice canvassed in the preceding section, this recent
move by the Council connotes more direct engagement with and regulation
of NSAs, whereas its previous resolution-making was primarily addressed
to states and only indirectly related to NSA conduct. At this juncture, detractors of this use of UNSC powers might voice concerns over the prospect
of that organ overstepping its bounds and assume its inability to bind nonmember states or nonstate entities because they fall outside of the UN’s
membership. Certainly, this type of “law of treaties” argument, which is
very much of classic vintage, acquired traction in some circles and might
140
find further grounding in one passage of the Namibia Advisory Opinion.
However, the UNSC’s practice over the last decades tells a different story.
Its resolutions have generated a solid track record of compliance, confirming the pervasive reach of its prescriptions, particularly but not exclusively
in the counterterrorism field. For instance, there is ample empirical evidence
that the UNSC can bind non-member states with its resolutions, a proposi141
tion which has also been endorsed in the literature. Of course, such power

139.
In addition to the resolutions canvassed below, see also the entries in Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters: Prospects and Challenges, 112 ASIL PROC. 301, 301–314 (2019) (including
contributions by David DeBartolo, Sandra Krähenmann, Moira Macmillian, and Vincent-Joël
Proulx).
140.
See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 126 (June 21). For scholarly takes on the reach of this
passage, see Kelvin Widdows, Security Council Resolutions and Non-Members of the United
Nations, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 461–62 (1978); Philippe Cahier, La Charte des Nations
Unies et les Etats Tiers, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON U.N.
LAW AND ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 81, 99–100 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975); see
also Öberg, supra note 70, at 885.
141.
See, e.g., JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE
OF LAW 65–67 (2007); Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security
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is of limited practical importance since virtually all states are members in
good standing of the UN.
That said, accepting that the UN Charter enjoys a quasi-constitutional
status within the international community might make the prospect of the
UNSC binding both non-member states and individuals/NSAs through its
142
resolutions more palatable. Indeed, leading publicists rely on these developments and highlight the “trend towards the constitutionalization of the international legal system,” which they explain mostly through increasing institutionalization and an enhanced emphasis on individual rights on the
143
international scene (to which one should add the emergence of individual
obligations as well). Given its role and features, the UNSC, while not strictly a “judicial” organ, can exercise “both decision-making and executive
144
powers.” This enables it to act to protect the interests of the international
community. In summary, while it is not endowed with “judicial” powers, “it
may incidentally perform certain quasi-judicial activities such as effecting
145
determinations or findings[,]” which presumably also cover issues sur146
rounding ICIR. The ICJ’s Kosovo Advisory Opinion further suggests that
the UNSC can formulate legal obligations directly binding upon individuals
and NSAs, either expressly or implicitly, although any implicitly formulated
obligation should be approached with caution because it might contravene
147
the principle of legality.
In Resolution 2170, the UNSC required states to take “national
148
measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters . . . .” Acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC further enumerated a series of
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 671, 674 (2015). Some of the relevant resolutions are also canvassed in the present account.
142.
For leading accounts framing the UN Charter as the constitution of the international
legal system, see FASSBENDER, supra note 125; Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 531
(1998). See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 99. On the constitutional impact of the law of international responsibility, see generally André Nollkaemper, Constitutionalization and the Unity
of the Law of International Responsibility, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 535 (2009).
143.
See Vera Gowlland-Debbas & Vassilis Pergantis, Rule of Law, in POST-CONFLICT
PEACE BUILDING: A LEXICON 320, 320–326 (Vincent Chetail ed., 2009); Vera GowllandDebbas, Security Council Change: The Pressure of Emerging International Public Policy, 65
INT’L J. 119, 131 (2009-2010).
144.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
145.
Id.
146.
See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 116 (July 22); text accompanying supra note 64.
147.
See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 97. For arguments cautioning against expanding
the UNSC’s powers, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and
the UN: A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1995).
148.
S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 8 (Aug. 15, 2014).
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condemnations and counterterrorism obligations incumbent upon individuals/NSAs, including:
(i) Strongly condemning the indiscriminate killing and targeting
of civilians, along with other atrocities perpetrated in Syria and
149
Iraq;
(ii) Demanding that all nonstate terrorist groups cease all violent
150
acts and disarm immediately;
(iii) Condemning recruitment of individuals by those terrorist entities, which exacerbates ongoing conflicts and contributes to vi151
olent radicalization;
(iv) Noting with concern that certain terrorist groups and individuals control oilfields and related infrastructure, supplementing
152
their income and recruitment efforts;
(v) Condemning any direct/indirect trade involving such terrorist
153
groups or individuals; and
(vi) Linking the actions of such organizations and individuals to its
terrorism sanctions regime, reiterating that it is prepared to list
154
relevant actors under that system.
As discussed in Part IV, these “quasi-judicial” moves might be more
aptly equated with the establishment/implementation of individual responsibility as opposed to constituting pure manifestations of (quasi-) “legislative”
power. Most importantly, in Resolution 2170, the Council established an
unequivocal connection between those terrorist factions’ conduct and the
potential individual responsibility of the authors of the atrocities, including
international criminal responsibility. The UNSC addressed NSAs directly
and categorically obligated them to prevent terrorism when it
[r]ecall[ed] that widespread or systematic attacks directed against
any civilian populations because of their ethnic or political background, religion or belief may constitute a crime against humanity,
emphasize[d] the need to ensure that ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida
are held accountable for abuses of [HR] and violations of [IHL],
[and] urge[d] all parties to prevent such violations and abus155
es . . . .

149.
Id. ¶ 2.
150.
Id. ¶ 4.
151.
Id. ¶ 7.
152.
Id. ¶ 13.
153.
Id. ¶ 14. The UNSC imposed similar obligations in other resolutions concerning
Daesh/ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals and groups associated with Al Qaeda. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015); S.C. Res. 2347, ¶ 2 (Mar. 24, 2017).
154.
S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 148, ¶ 7.
155.
Id. ¶ 3 (emphases added); see also id., at pmbl. (“[r]eaffirming that those who have
committed or are otherwise responsible for violations of [IHL] or violations or abuses of [HR]
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The UNSC continued building on these pronouncements. As “one of
the most important quasi-legislative efforts of the Council since resolution
156
1373 (2001),” Resolution 2178 was adopted one month after Resolution
2170, following a special sitting chaired by President Barack Obama and
157
corralling many heads of state and/or government. It pursues the legacy of
Resolutions 1373, 2161, and 2170 by requiring states to implement several
measures constricting the movement and recruitment of foreign terrorist
fighters. This development further bolstered the UNSC’s comprehensive
158
counterterrorism strategy. Moreover, Resolution 2178 stresses the importance of de-radicalization/counter-radicalization efforts, particularly by
advocating a grassroots and concerted approach to achieve those objectives.
This approach further reinforces the notion that individuals who commit terrorist acts or support such conduct are liable to engage their ICIR. Strikingly, the resolution directly addresses individuals in its first operative paragraph, when the Council “demand[ed] that all foreign terrorist fighters
159
disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict.”

in Iraq and Syria, including persecution of individuals on the basis of their religion or belief,
or on political grounds, must be held accountable . . . .”) (italicization in original).
156.
Marko Milanovic, UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/un-security-counciladopts-resolution-2178-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters/.
157.
See also MYRIAM FEINBERG, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 40–42 (2016) (arguing that Resolution 2178
“goes at least one step further than Resolution 1373,” largely because of its treatment of
states’ obligations regarding the freezing of individuals’ assets). For critical takes, see Kent
Roach, Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law Comes of Age, in COMPARATIVE COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 1, 14–15 (Kent Roach ed., 2015) (lamenting the resolution’s “definitional
ambiguity,” opining that it “will increase the risk that dissenters will be investigated and punished as terrorists. This may undermine the legitimacy of some counter-terrorism efforts.”);
Kai Ambos, Our Terrorists, Your Terrorists? The United Nations Security Council Urges
States to Combat “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, but Does Not Define “Terrorism,” EJIL:
TALK! (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/our-terrorists-your-terrorists-the-unitednations-security-council-urges-states-to-combat-foreign-terrorist-fighters-but-does-not-defineterrorism/; Martin Scheinin, Back to Post-9/11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/
15407/post-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/.
158.
See S.C. Res. 2178 (Sep. 24, 2014). On foreign fighters, including various aspects
of Resolution 2178, see FOREIGN FIGHTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BEYOND
(Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2016). On Resolution 2178’s potential effects on the obligations
of individuals, see Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part I, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighteras-an-international-legal-person-part-i/; Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178
(2014): The “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part II, EJIL:
TALK! (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-theforeign-terrorist-fighter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-ii/.
159.
S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 158, ¶ 1 (italicization in original). On the direct effect of
this resolution under international law, see PETERS, supra note 3, at 94, 508–09 (arguing that
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This survey of recent practice highlights several key ideas. First and
foremost, these resolutions establish a clear nexus between terrorism and the
prospect of international individual responsibility. Second, by “legislating”
and formulating important primary obligations for both individuals/groups
and states, the UNSC has signaled that the violation of these duties will
have important implications for the deployment of different levels of responsibility. As a result, relevant UNSC “legislative” forays and subsequent
enforcement of its legislated counterterrorism norms under Chapter VII reinforced their binding character and bolstered the case for ICIR.
The UNSC thus sends important messages to actual and potential violators of international law and enhances the legal system’s overall coherence
and robustness. The UNSC also offers valuable guidance for the post-breach
calculus and clarifies relevant primary obligations, which will illuminate
situations in which individuals and NSAs engage in wrongful conduct. Indeed, UNSC determinations of individual responsibility can serve as an instructive benchmark and powerful registration of legal guilt “on the record,”
which will facilitate subsequent processes seeking to implement the concerned actor’s/actors’ responsibility in another setting, be it judicially or in
160
some less formal avenue.
Third, these precedents suggest that it is difficult to completely dissociate (or disentangle) the prospect of individual responsibility from SR considerations. Rethinking the contents and contours of individual responsibility must be done against the backdrop of a comprehensive strategy, taking
due account of states’ role(s) (and their obligations) in combating terrorism.
The UNSC’s post-9/11 discourse is replete with responsibility-expansive
language regarding states’ duties and also those of NSAs by implication. Indeed, in areas such as transboundary pollution and terrorism, states’ compliance with their primary obligations will often remain dependent on the actions of private individuals/legal persons within their jurisdiction, over
which those states may or may not exert sufficient control for the purposes
of both prevention and attribution under SR.
Last, on a related point, even when contemplating individual responsibility, the role of states cannot be excised altogether from the equation. The
effectiveness and enforcement of global counterterrorism efforts can only be
achieved by enlisting their assistance, particularly through the exercise of
161
their legislative power. Even a brief survey of domestic legislation conthe prohibition on travelling to a region to participate in, support or finance terrorism found at
paragraphs 1, 6 and 8 might create directly enforceable obligations under international law).
160.
For a compatible argument concerning SR, see Giorgio Gaja, Réflexions sur le Rôle
du Conseil de Sécurité dans le Nouvel Ordre Mondial: A Propos des Rapports entre Maintien
de la Paix et Crimes Internationaux des États, 97 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 297, 309 (1993) (Fr.).
161.
See also High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (“States are still
the front-line responders to today’s threats.” These threats include “terrorism”). More recently, in a resolution highly relevant for the regulation of unlawful activity carried out by indi-
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firms that several states have criminalized individuals’ attempts to travel
abroad to join or receive training from terrorist organizations.
UNSC Resolutions 2170 and 2178 apparently did not envisage a broader conception of “individual responsibility” by focusing exclusively on “terrorist” fighters. While preventing individuals from joining the ranks of terrorist organizations is an important objective, these resolutions do not
contemplate emerging challenges that may have unforeseen implications for
ICIR. For instance, they would presumably fail to capture mercenaries or
humanitarian do-gooders traveling abroad to fight against Daesh/ISIL. In
some instances, anti-ISIL militias have perpetrated IHL or HR violations,
which could potentially trigger the wrongdoing individuals’ legal accountability under an expanded theory of international individual responsibility.
What about a medic who travels to Syria but stays beyond the frontlines, only providing support to an anti-ISIL militia that perpetrates HR/IHL
violations? What if the sideline supporter decides to take up arms against
Daesh/ISIL and, in the process, violates IHL or HR norms? These types of
scenarios are both increasingly frequent and reveal policy and legal gaps in
regimes governing individual responsibility for acts falling outside of strict162
ly defined “terrorist” activities. Setting aside the question whether there is
a moral equivalency between the types of “foreign fighter” in these examples, the UNSC refers to “foreign terrorist fighters” and connects the threat
such individuals represent not only to their acts but also to their “providing
163
or receiving of terrorist training . . . .” These new and difficult scenarios
raise more queries than solutions, but they must be addressed squarely going
forward in devising individual responsibility models.

viduals—in particular, foreign (terrorist) fighters—the UNSC stressed that “Member States
have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to
terrorism.” See S.C. Res. 2395, supra note 122, at pmbl. (reiterating, throughout the resolution, several state-based obligations to prevent individuals from perpetrating or supporting
terrorist activities). See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 16, 21–23.
162.
A few interesting cases have arisen in Singapore. See. e.g., Shashi Jayakumar, The
Curious Case of Wang Yuandongyi, STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016),
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-curious-case-of-wang-yuandongyi; Yan Liang Lim,
4 Singaporeans Arrested Under ISA for Involvement in Armed Violence Abroad, STRAITS
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/4-singaporeans-arrestedunder-isa-for-involvement-in-armed-violence-abroad (recounting the 2016 arrest of four citizens who planned to travel to Syria and Yemen. At least one individual was intent on fighting
against Daesh/ISIL in Syria, but all four men were arrested since they had “demonstrated a
readiness to use violence to pursue their religious cause. . . . [T]hey [were] assessed to pose a
security threat to Singapore.”).
163.
S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 158, ¶¶ 4–5 (emphasis added); see also Simon Chesterman, Dogs of War or Jackals of Terror? Foreign Fighters and Mercenaries in International
Law, 18 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 389, 396–97, 399 (2016). More recently, the UNSC enhanced its regulation of foreign terrorist fighters, arguably extending previous coverage of
individuals’ and NSAs’ international legal obligations beyond what is mandated by both Res.
1373 and the sectoral anti-terrorism conventions. See S.C. Res. 2396, supra note 16.
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IV. The UNSC as Implementer: Impact on
Individual Responsibility
As prefaced above, the “targeted” sanctions regime remains considerably relevant for this account. The freezing of terrorist assets and the terrorism sanctions regime have been used, supplemented, and refined liberally
164
by the UNSC through a series of resolutions. In addition, there are at least
two other principal ways in which UNSC action can enhance the individual
responsibility (broadly understood) of private terrorists on the international
plane. On one hand, the UNSC may pave the way for establishing individual
criminal responsibility, either through hortatory language or binding prescriptions in its resolutions or by exercising its referral power under the
Rome Statute. On the other hand, the Council may enlist the logic and conceptual tools of the law of SR to address the wrongful conduct of individuals and NSAs. Both options are discussed in turn below.

A. The UNSC and Criminal Liability
First, the UNSC considers that some terrorist atrocities could result in
individual criminal responsibility. For instance, in Resolutions 2170 and
2379, the UNSC considered that some terrorist acts might qualify as crimes
against humanity, war crimes, or genocide and insisted that their authors
165
should be held accountable. In many resolutions, the UNSC only addresses NSAs directly to the extent that it reiterates that they must comply with
existing IHL or HR obligations or duties arising under a peace treaty to
166
which they are parties in armed conflict contexts. However, that trend is
rapidly changing, at least following recent UNSC “quasi-legislative” forays
concerning “foreign terrorist fighters” (and sometimes “hybrid” forays,
combining “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” elements).
Indeed, the co-extensiveness between individual criminal responsibility
and other normative schemes comes into relief when investigating regime
interaction under the broad umbrella of “individual responsibility.” In many
instances, this symbiosis cannot and should not be avoided as those regimes
can be mutually reinforcing. Such interplay should be encouraged to bolster
all relevant legal mechanisms deployed to enhance individual accountability
and combat impunity. The promotion of increased civil/legal accountability,
164.
For the ISIL/Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, see, for example, S.C. Res. 1267
(Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 124; S.C. Res. 1730 (Dec. 19, 2006); S.C. Res.
1904 (Dec. 17, 2009); S.C. Res. 1989 (June 27, 2011); S.C. Res. 2161 (June 17, 2014); S.C.
Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015).
165.
See S.C. Res. 2379, ¶ 1 (Sept. 21, 2017); supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 340. In addition to calling upon nonstate groups to observe
undertakings under internationalized peace treaties, the UNSC has also directed such entities
“to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and with rules and principles of international law, in particular [IHL], [HR] and refugee law, and to implement fully
the relevant decisions” or cease the violations of such obligations immediately. See S.C. Res.
1296, at pmbl. (Apr. 19, 2000).
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at any level of governance, will reinforce norms and narratives against impunity. Insofar as it does, key stakeholders will be incentivized to block
harmful activity, repair past breaches, facilitate attribution of responsibility
167
to wrongdoing actors, and better prevent and/or deter future harms. After
all, the UNSC has a key—even if at times troubled—role to play in
168
strengthening and promoting the international rule of law. This likely encompasses its involvement in determining and implementing international
responsibility for wrongful conduct in apposite circumstances.
Within the confines of individual criminal responsibility—which can
remain co-extensive with a would-be ICIR regime—there are ways the
UNSC can bolster existing accountability mechanisms. More generally, it
could make more use of its Article 13(b) referral power under the Rome
Statute. This mechanism enables the ICC to assume jurisdiction over a “situation in which one or more” of the crimes enumerated in Article 5 “appears to have been committed [and] is referred to the Prosecutor by the Se169
curity Council acting under Chapter VII.” This course of action, however,
poses several obstacles. First, such a robust exercise of power by the UNSC
and consequently the ICC could harm the ICC’s already shaky reputation in
some regions of the world. For instance, several African nations have withdrawn or announced their intention to withdraw as parties to the Rome Stat-

167.
This argument is perhaps strengthened in situations where reparation beyond a
mere determination of breach/non-pecuniary remedies can be envisaged. Indeed, some publicists associate retributive, punitive and deterrent dimensions with the concept of compensatory reparation. See, e.g., ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM 371 (2010). Unsurprisingly, at the interstate
level, an international law violation entails the duty to repair any resulting harm. This oft-cited
principle finds one of its earliest judicial expressions in Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.),
Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26) and has since been invoked countless
times in different settings and codified by the ILC. See, e.g., Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v.
Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13); ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 148 (1994); Constantin
Economides, La Responsabilité de l’État pour Fait Internationalement Illicite, in 34
THESAURUS ACROASIUM: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 24, at
165, 203–04; Christine Gray, Is There an International Law of Remedies?, 56 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 25, 29 (1985); Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 835 (2002). The outstanding query, however, remains
whether this general principle can be extrapolated and applied to NSAs (that is, individuals
and groups). Based on the arguments advanced in this Article, it appears that this transposition
could be envisaged in some ICIR scenarios.
168.
See generally STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL (Jeremy Farrall & Hilary Charlesworth eds., 2016).
169.
Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 13(b). For a recent account addressing the relationship between the UNSC and ICC and exploring the centrality of the referral mechanism in
that dynamic, see GABRIEL M. LENTNER, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE REFERRAL MECHANISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2018) (assimilating the nature of this referral mechanism to a conferral of powers from the
UNSC to the ICC).
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170

ute on the grounds that the ICC harbors an African bias. If the UNSC used
its Chapter VII powers to initiate cases that predominantly involved African
countries, that bias narrative would gain further traction. Second, there exists a broader concern about jurisdiction and consent. The Article 13(b)
mechanism is perceived by some as operating as a “back door” type jurisdictional hook by permitting the ICC to investigate and prosecute cases
171
concerning locales that have not consented to the Rome Statute. While
there are compelling reasons for this authority to exist, there are also compelling reasons that the UNSC exercise it only in the most extreme of circumstances.
This mechanism is attractive in theory, but its infrequent invocation illustrates states’ lack of political will as one of many factors prompting them
172
not to support ICC proceedings resulting from UNSC referrals. Those
states include Rome Statute parties—for example, South Africa, Nigeria,
Uganda, Djibouti, and Chad. For instance, ICC arrest warrants against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir followed from a situation referred by the
173
UNSC. Yet, President al-Bashir visited several countries after the indict174
ment, and they refused to arrest and extradite him. While I am not sug170.
See, e.g., Brendon J. Cannon et al., The International Criminal Court and Africa:
Contextualizing the Anti-ICC Narrative, 2 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2016); Kamari M.
Clarke et al., Africa and the ICC: An Introduction, in AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF
JUSTICE 1, 1 (Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016); Sarah McGibbon, Risky Business: Witnesses and Africa’s ICC Withdrawal, 28 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 157–58 (2015); Mandiaye
Niang, Africa and the Legitimacy of the ICC in Question, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 615, 615
(2017). In fairness, some states that initially announced their intention to withdraw from the
Rome Statute have reversed their intentions or have seen their domestic courts block their
withdrawal. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Shift by South Africa on International Criminal
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2017, at A9; Agence France-Presse, Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN, (Oct. 28, 2017, 8:34 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leaveinternational-criminal-court; Jason Burke, South African Judge Blocks Attempt to Withdraw
from ICC, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 22, 2017, 5:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
feb/22/south-african-judge-blocks-attempt-to-withdraw-from-international-criminal-court.
171.
See, e.g., Sherif Elgebeily, The Politicization of International Criminal Law
through the UN Security Council—Article 13(b) and the Flawed Backdoor to Prosecution, in
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Holly Cullen et al. eds., forthcoming,
2019). For a neocolonialism-based critique of the Article 13(b) mechanism, see generally RES
SCHUERCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AT THE MERCY OF POWERFUL STATES:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEO-COLONIALISM CLAIM MADE BY AFRICAN STAKEHOLDERS
169–217 (2017). On the controversial relationship between the UNSC and the ICC, see also
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council and the ICC, in DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL
MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 25 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2013).
172.
See, e.g., Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Before the United Nations
Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), INT’L CRIM.
CT., ¶ 14 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-statunsc-darfur.
173.
See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
174.
See also Fatou Bensouda (Prosecutor of the Int’l Crim. Court), Twenty-Third Rep.
to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), ¶ 11 (June 9, 2016) (also la-
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gesting that these omissions necessarily entailed legal effects, the lack of
political will of those states to support ICC proceedings, many of which
were parties to the Rome Statute, clearly evidenced the shortcomings of the
175
ICL system. Of course, many other factors could be at play, such as a lack
of appetite among the UNSC Permanent Members to refer situations to the
ICC. It could also be that the UNSC has declined to recognize situations as
sufficiently severe to warrant referral. Conversely, there have likely been
176
genuine missed opportunities as well. When situations were referred to
the ICC under Article 13(b), states’ subsequent inaction might also be explained by their misguided belief that international law prevents them from
arresting a head of state.
An indictment could also be issued by the ICC Prosecutor against the
Filipino President Mr. Rodrigo Duterte in light of alleged large-scale extrajudicial killings and other abuses in his “war on drugs.” Indeed, the Prosecutor hinted at this possibility in 2016, not to mention that the ICC opened a
177
preliminary examination into the matter in February 2018. However, no
UNSC referral would be required in such a case since the Philippines was a
Rome Statute party at the material time, despite recently withdrawing from
178
the ICC. A unique feature of that instrument resides in Article 27, which
disables official capacity or head-of-state immunity from barring the
179
Court’s jurisdiction. In broader terms, these examples and others only
menting the UNSC’s inaction), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/23-otp-rep-UNSCdarfur_ENG.pdf.
175.
For a critical take from the perspective of counterterrorism, see generally VincentJoël Proulx, Counterterrorism and National Security: The Domestic/International Law Interface, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 171.
176.
See generally Elgebeily, supra note 171.
177.
See Nikko Dizon, International Court Warns PH on Killings, PHILLIPINE DAILY
INQUIRER (Oct. 16, 2016, 1:36 AM), https://globalnation.inquirer.net/146810/internationalcourt-warns-ph-on-killings?utm_expid=.XqNwTug2W6nwDVUSgFJXed.1. On the ICC’s
preliminary examination, see Preliminary Examination: The Philippines, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines. (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
178.
In fact, there is a pending case before The Philippines’ Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of the announced withdrawal. See also Felipe Villamor, Duterte Says
Philippines to Exit Court at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2018, at A6. The fate of this
constitutional challenge is now unknown, however, since the Philippines’ withdrawal from the
ICC became effective on March 17, 2019. The withdrawal should not affect the ongoing examination and potential future proceedings against Mr. Duterte since “the ICC retains its jurisdiction over crimes committed during the time in which the State was party to the Statute
and may exercise this jurisdiction over these crimes even after the withdrawal becomes effective.” ICC Statement on The Philippines’ Notice of Withdrawal: State Participation in Rome
Statute System Essential to International Rule of Law, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-unsc-darfur. See also Raul
Dancel, Philippines Leaves International Criminal Court as it Probes Duterte’s Drugs
Crackdown, STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/seasia/philippines-leaves-international-criminal-court-as-it-probes-dutertes-drugs-crackdown.
179.
One potential problem arises when attempting to remove immunity rationae materiae to downgrade heads of state, or other high-level officials, to the status of regular interna-

260

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 40:215

evince the inherent political implications of such a procedure while confirming the paucity of relevant precedents related to “terrorism” and other subversive activities perpetrated by NSAs.
The biggest stumbling block to this approach resides in the fact that the
Rome Statute failed to create a stand-alone jurisdictional basis for adjudicating “terrorism” crimes. But all is not lost. Through creative arguments, one
can “read in” terrorist acts meeting all other Rome Statute “threshold” requirements of core crimes in apposite factual scenarios. After 9/11, some
advocated a rapprochement between terrorist acts of a sufficient scale to
180
qualify as either crimes against humanity (for example, the 9/11 attacks)
181
or war crimes and ICC jurisdictional requirements. Arguably, these pos182
tures were later assisted by jurisprudential developments at the ICTY and
183
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”). That said, the consensus remains
that the ICC currently does not have jurisdiction over “terrorism” as a stand184
alone crime. An amendment to the Rome Statute would be required to
create such a category.
tional individuals, subject to a would-be ICIR. In such cases, the applicable legal regime is illdefined, despite some publicists’ hopeful outlook. See Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and
Human Rights: Is There a Future after Germany v. Italy?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 125, 139–
44 (2013).
180.
See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 26–41, 52 (2002); Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era:
Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1009, 1080 (2004); ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING
TERRORISM 202–72 (2004).
181.
See Sébastien Jodoin, Terrorism as a War Crime, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 77, 77,
108 (2007).
182.
The ICTY confirmed the existence of a customary war crime of “spreading terror
amongst a civilian population.” Prosecutor v. Galiü, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment,
¶¶ 79, 87–90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); see also Ben Saul,
Crimes and Prohibitions of “Terror” and “Terrorism” in Armed Conflict: 1919–2005, 4 J.
INT’L L. PEACE & ARMED CONFLICT 264, 269 (2005). Previously, some scholars had advanced that “terrorism” amounted to an international customary crime. See ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 120–30 (2003).
183.
In 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (“STL”) Appeals Chamber found that a
customary international crime of terrorism exists during peacetime. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash,
Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, ¶¶ 83–113, 145–48 (Special Trib. for Leb. Feb.
16, 2011). For critical takes, see Kai Ambos, Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism Under International Law?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
655 (2011); Ben Saul, Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism, 24 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 677 (2011).
184.
See Andreas Zimmermann, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law: Article
5, in ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 111, 113–
15 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 994
(2001).
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Some “first wave” scholars argued that the UNSC can facilitate ICC
prosecutions by referring cases to the Court. They suggested that the Council could do so when confronted with individuals/organizations that committed terrorist acts conforming with the requirements of Article 7 of the Rome
185
Statute (that is, crimes against humanity). Recently, there has been a recrudescence of this line of argument, or at least a push toward broadening
186
the ICC’s jurisdictional scope to encompass “terrorism” crimes, while
considerable skepticism over the viability of such a prospect continues to
187
animate other camps. Nevertheless, the practical and conceptual problem
with this prospect lies in the fact that, to qualify as “war crimes,” terrorist
acts must necessarily be committed in armed conflict.
Moreover, to qualify as “crimes against humanity,” the facts underlying
any terrorist acts presumably falling within ICC jurisdiction must fulfil the
requisite elements of this core crime under Article 7. Ultimately, one would
still be faced with crimes against humanity (because the underlying acts
meet all statutory and jurisprudential requirements for that category of
crime) that also happen to constitute “terrorism,” irrespective of how that
188
term is defined. Hence, this conclusion would strictly be a factual appreciation with no legal implications or effect whatsoever under the current
ICC structure. That is a far cry from digging a new jurisdictional furrow in
which “terrorism” can be accommodated on a standalone basis. An alternate
avenue is to create a specialized international/hybrid tribunal to handle terrorism cases. The UNSC could also institute an ad hoc tribunal, but this path
is fraught with many potential pitfalls, chief amongst them being the lack of
189
a universally agreed upon definition of “terrorism.” More importantly,

185.
See, e.g., Proulx, supra note 180, at 1018–19. But see generally Robert Cryer, Terrorism and the International Criminal Court, 82 AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION REFORM J.,
Autumn 2003, at 14 (arguing that the UNSC should not rewrite the Rome Statute through its
resolutions).
186.
See Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 219
(2012); Angela Hare, A New Forum for the Prosecution of Terrorists: Exploring the Possibility of the Addition of Terrorism to the Rome Statute’s Jurisdiction, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 95 (2010); Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sin Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection
of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 192 (2008).
187.
See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, The Quest for Individual Adjudication and Accountability: Are International Tribunals the Right Response to Terrorism?, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
497, 501–06 (2010); Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, From Rome to Nuremberg with Romanticism: On Terrorism, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 689, 710–11 (2016).
188.
See ANDREA BIANCHI & YASMIN NAQVI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND TERRORISM 247–56 (2011).
189.
On this aspect and the challenges of setting up a specialized “terrorism” tribunal,
see Bibi van Ginkel, Combating Terrorism: Proposals for Improving the International Legal
Framework, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 126, at
461, 470. After 9/11, some commentators nonetheless suggested the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal to address Al Qaeda’s unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the ‘War Against Terrorism,’ 78 INT’L AFF. 301, 305 (2002).
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these considerations echo my earlier remark that the international community’s overemphasis on individual criminal responsibility might be misguided,
overly selective/arbitrary, and ultimately counterproductive in identifying
and developing richer individual accountability models.

B. The UNSC and Civil Liability
The second and more relevant approach available to the UNSC is to follow what could be characterized as “SR logic,” but transposed to an individual responsibility setting. In fact, the UNSC has sometimes done so very
plainly. As a preliminary matter, any apprehension about potentially elevating subversive NSAs to an undesirable level by granting them (limited) legal personality for the purposes of holding them legally accountable must be
dispelled. Indeed, “it is necessary not to give too much weight to the fear,
often stated in the academic literature, that such groups would thereby be
accorded legitimacy and the legal personality, even if functional and lim190
ited, which is the necessary corollary of responsibility.” A purist’s objection to this approach might be rooted in the belief that NSAs have no formal
role to play, or any at all, within international law’s universe, either as law191
making entities or formal/direct subjects of the discipline. However, this
view is increasingly (and rightly) rejected by many publicists as antiquated,
overly state-centric, and simply impractical in light of present-day security
192
threats. For example, such a rigid and overly formalistic construction
stands in opposition to the reality of non-international armed conflicts. It
faces persuasive functionalist claims “assert[ing] a need to recognize greater
legal parity among parties to [such conflicts] where rebels control substan193
tial territory and in other ways act like states.” Above all, the simple fact
190.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 338.
191.
See, e.g., d’Aspremont, supra note 79, at 25.
192.
See HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS, supra note 11; NON-STATE
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11; PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 11. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION,
EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8; BARBARA WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010); Agata Kleczkowska, Armed Non-State Actors and Customary International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS
AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note
8, at 60; Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actors: Law-Takers or LawMakers? Is That the Question?, in NON-STATE ACTORS DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 195 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2010).
193.
Fox et al., supra note 65, at 669. For views on both sides of this debate, see William Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors, 42 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 207, 229–40 nn. 78–131 (2015). For a review of the legal implications of “territorial
nonstate actors” in different contexts, see Natalia Cwicinskaja, International Human Rights
Law and Territorial Non-State Actors: Cases of the Council of Europe Region, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 8, at 260–84; Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 21 (2013).
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remains that for international law to ignore the importance and role of NSAs
194
in norm creation and enforcement is to ignore reality.
A vital objective in articulating a general ICIR regime is to facilitate the
development of a narrative against impunity. The power of that rhetoric
might in turn embolden key constituencies and stakeholders to pursue
claims against wrongdoing individuals and NSAs, which may lead to civil
lawsuits, reparation, or the shaming of unlawful conduct and/or actors. This
narrative might also incentivize some states to better monitor and regulate
the activities of subversive NSAs under their jurisdiction or control. At the
same time, it is imperative that the conceptual architecture of a general ICIR
regime operate on the understanding that a necessarily limited legal personality be conferred to NSAs within this framework. It follows that, “[i]n reality, legal personality is only of value to the extent of its social utility,
which in this case is the aim of making the formidable power to cause harm
of such entities, a power which is not reducible to the individual acts of their
195
members, coincide with a corresponding capacity to be held responsible.”
In short, the architects of a general ICIR regime must be cautious not to
produce the absurd result of unduly legitimizing subversive and/or unlawful
NSAs. Similarly, the resulting regime must not grant such actors rights incompatible with the nature of their mission statements and actions. For
most, it would be unthinkable to formally recognize Daesh/ISIL’s or Boko
Haram’s right to claim territorial control and political independence or their
right to sue. These considerations must be woven into the ICIR regime’s
conceptual and theoretical fabric.
Relevant precedents confirm that the UNSC can implement SR for state
196
failures to prevent terrorism or violations of other counterterrorism duties.
Indeed, the UNSC sometimes attributes wrongful conduct to states and cor-

194.
By way of example, NGOs have been instrumental in expanding the enforcement of
HR in the counterterrorism context. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, NGOs in Terrorism Cases: Diffusing Norms of International Human Rights Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at
459.
195.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 338.
196.
See PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98; Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution, supra note 98. On the UNSC and SR generally, see Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, The
Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System, in THE ROLE
OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Giorgio Gaja, Comment: The Impact of
Security Council Resolutions on State Responsibility, in PEACE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 53–60 (Georg Nolte ed., 2009);
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, id., at 277; Vera Gowlland-Debbas,
Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 55 (1994) [hereinafter Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action];
Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security
Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1970).
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respondingly devises legal consequences flowing from the breaches it has
197
determined. This translates into the imposition of secondary obligations
upon the responsible states. When it holds states accountable, the Council
thus draws heavily on the SR repertoire, sometimes without expressly labelling its decisions accordingly. It nonetheless imposes obligations of cessation, assurances of non-repetition, satisfaction, other forms of reparation under Chapter VII, and other secondary obligations outside Chapter VII
198
(including reparation broadly and compensation specifically).
Similar logic could govern ICIR and manifest in the UNSC’s attribution
of wrongful conduct to NSAs, subject to the caveats expressed in section
II(A) concerning the elaboration of a remedial normative scheme that heeds
the distinct nature and character of NSAs. Hence, “[t]he criminal responsibility of the members of various armed groups,” affirmed by UNSC resolutions, “does not constitute the only way in which those individuals may be
199
held to account for illegal acts which are attributable to them.” In fact,
“[a]nother form of responsibility may be said to exist, as a result of the
200
‘sanctions’ adopted by the Security Council against such groups . . . .” In
contrast to the above situations, however, the UNSC has stopped short of
ordering reparation or pecuniary compensation when holding NSAs responsible.
That said, “there is no justification for subjecting non-State groups to
rules which are substantially different from those applicable to States. An
evolution of the practice of the [UNSC] in this regard is not to be exclud201
ed . . . .” This reality not only stems from the nexus between SR and individual responsibility but also from the blind spots characterizing the former
regime discussed above. After all, this Article’s introductory remarks must
be reiterated in respect to armed bands and criminal groups. While, in principle, nothing precludes the law of SR from being applied coextensively
with individual responsibility mechanisms, it is precisely SR’s inefficiency
in dealing with such actors that would justify recognizing an international
responsibility of armed bands and criminal groups. At least, this line of ar202
gument has been persuasively defended by some commentators.

197.
See, e.g., PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 155–260; GowllandDebbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System, supra note 196; Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action, supra note
196.
198.
For relevant arguments and practice, see generally PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING,
supra note 98; Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution, supra note 98.
199.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 339.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 340.
202.
Id. at 335–36. Relatedly, existing scholarship has generally treated the legal responsibility of armed opposition groups as a question governed by ICL, IHL, and HR. See
LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).

Winter 2019]

International Civil Individual Responsibility

265

Stepping outside the familiar HR and IHL fields, on at least one occasion the UNSC transposed a fundamental international legal norm expressly
reserved for sovereign states to NSAs. It is widely known that the definition
of “aggression” in international law was originally adopted to capture un203
lawful use of force carried out by states. Nevertheless, in 1977, the UNSC
attributed an act of aggression to nonstate mercenaries for their subversive
204
activities in Benin. What is more, the Council noted that “the Government
of Benin ha[d] reserved its right with respect to any eventual claims for
205
compensation which it may wish to assert . . . .” This precedent is significant because it evidences the UNSC’s willingness to transpose state-centric
legal rationales to the unlawful acts of NSAs. It directly supports this Article’s central argument in that regard. In addition, the Council was cautious
not to specify which entity could be the target of Benin’s eventual reparative
case, not to mention that it used the plural form when suggesting that the
victim state might have actionable compensation claims. At a minimum, this
conclusion suggests that multiple undefined parties might have been responsible for that wrongful act (and on the hook for compensation). In the bestcase scenario for present purposes, this UNSC resolution suggests that those
responsible parties could include nonstate entities. Irrespective of one’s interpretation of that precedent, it bolsters the case for ICIR in international
law.
While the UNSC has generally been reluctant to impose direct orders
on private businesses and/or individuals, it certainly has the ability to do so.
For example, the UNSC could impose a financial embargo and determine to
206
which firms that measure applies. Yet, the Council has not done this,
which begs the question—why? One answer, at least in part, might be the
absence of a comprehensive legal regime governing this type of situation.
The particular legal relationships and the consequences thereof lack definition and are thus not operative.
Moreover, conventional wisdom dictates that states are better situated to
induce individuals under their jurisdiction to comply with constraining legal
207
orders. There is no reason why more targeted UNSC-prescribed individual
203.
See G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
204.
See S.C. Res. 405, ¶ 2 (Apr. 14, 1977) (“Strongly condemns the act of armed aggression perpetrated” by the NSAs) (italicization in original); see also Cohen, supra note 186,
at 249–50. For a compatible UNSC resolution on the unlawful activities of nonstate mercenaries against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see S.C. Res. 239 (July 10, 1967).
205.
S.C. Res. 405, supra note 204, ¶ 9.
206.
Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 319.
207.
See id. However, the UNSC exercising such power might help palliate shortcomings of domestically-based transnational HR litigation, especially given recent developments
surrounding ATCA’s application and the European Court of Human Right’s (“ECtHR”) rejection of universal civil jurisdiction. With respect to ATCA, consider the following passage
from the U.S. Court of Appeals: “No corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability
(whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law of human rights.
Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several occasions, explicitly rejected
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responsibility measures could not be facilitated by those same states. Just
because the measures emanate from the Council does not mean that they
cannot be given simultaneous legal effect domestically, internationally, and
perhaps even transnationally. On this last point, it may well be that relevant
UNSC measures could enlist the support of other NSAs for more effective
implementation. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)
has been pivotal in developing “soft law” standards to combat terrorist financing, efforts which could be extended to support UNSC-imposed consequences targeting particularly subversive NSAs in the global financial sec208
tor.

C. Relevant UNSC Practice
While it might not have ordered pecuniary compensation as a direct
consequence of its findings of individual responsibility, the UNSC has attributed wrongful conduct and, by extension, individual responsibility to
NSAs in the past, including the National Union for the Total Independence
209
210
of Angola (“UNITA”), Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, Al Qaeda in
211
212
213
Afghanistan, the Janjaweed in Sudan, and other terrorist groups. In

the idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability has not attained a discernible, much
less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their relations inter se, and it cannot,
as a result, form the basis of a suit under the [ATCA]. Acknowledging the absence of corporate liability . . . is . . . a recognition that the States of the world, in their relations with one
another . . . have determined that moral and legal responsibility for heinous crimes should rest
on the individual whose conduct makes him or her ‘hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind.’ ”
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted);
see also id. at 121. On more recent developments, see infra Part V.
208.
See Terrorist Financing: FATF’s Strategy on Combating Terrorist Financing,
FATF,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/terroristfinancing.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2019). On the FATF’s contributions to combating terrorist financing, see
Ben Saul, The Emerging International Law of Terrorism, 1 IND. Y.B. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 10–
12 (2010).
209.
See infra nn. 223, 232, 240, 246, and accompanying text; see also S.C. Res. 1127
(Aug. 28, 1997).
210.
See S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 7 (Apr. 13, 1993) (“[r]eaffirm[ing] its condemnation of all violations of [IHL], in particular the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and reaffirm[ing] that those
who commit or order the commission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in
respect of such acts;”) (markings omitted); see also S.C. Res. 713 (Sept. 25, 1991).
211.
See S.C. Res. 1390, at pmbl. (Jan. 16, 2002) (“[c]ondemning the Al-Qaida network
and other associated terrorist groups, for the multiple criminal, terrorist acts, aimed at causing
the deaths of numerous innocent civilians, and the destruction of property,”) (italicization in
original).
212.
See S.C. Res. 1564, at pmbl. (Sept. 18, 2004); see also id., ¶¶ 1, 7.
213.
See Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the
International Legal System, supra note 196, at 307–08; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibility and the United Nations Charter, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 13, at 129; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International Re-
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2015, it attributed a series of attacks to Daesh/ISIL in straightforward terms,
including the destruction of a Russian airliner over Egypt’s Sinai desert. In
that context, the Council
[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the horrifying
terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL also known as Da’esh which
took place on 26 June 2015 in Sousse, on 10 October 2015 Ankara,
on 31 October 2015 over Sinaï, on 12 November 2015 in Beirut
and on 13 November 2015 in Paris, and all other attacks perpetrated
by ISIL also known as Da’esh, including hostage-taking and killing, and note[d] it has the capability and intention to carry out further attacks and regard[ed] all such acts of terrorism as a threat to
214
peace and security . . . .
This resolution followed UNSC Resolution 2166. There, the Council condemned in equally severe terms the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, and “[d]emand[ed] that those responsible . . . be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts to
establish accountability,” again demonstrating the important synergy be215
tween SR and individual responsibility.
Similarly, the UNSC “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms recent terror216
ist attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the region . . . .” It
noted “with concern the number of attacks in Mogadishu,” before “express[ing] further concern that Al-Shabaab continue to carry out terrorist
217
acts in Somalia . . . .” Most important, the Council emphasized a direct
nexus between its attribution of the terrorist attacks and the importance of
individual responsibility, at least in a rhetorical and sweeping sense. It nonetheless resulted in a strong message of deterrence and accountability. In one
operative clause, the UNSC “underline[d] the importance of holding perpe218
trators to account (in full compliance with international law) . . . .” Moreover, the Council’s conclusion here unequivocally links its opprobrium with
normative and legal consequences under international law, suggesting that it
could assume some role—however limited or infrequent—through a general
regime for the establishment and implementation of ICIR. In a more recent
resolution dealing with Somalia, the UNSC strongly condemned the devassponsibility, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 8 (Andrea
Bianchi ed., 2004).
214.
S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 2015) (italicization in original). On the airliner attack,
see Gwyn Topham et al., Egypt Plane Crash: Russia Says Jet Was Bombed in Terror Attack,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2015 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/
egypt-plane-crash-bomb-jet-russia-security-service.
215.
S.C. Res. 2166, ¶¶ 1, 11 (July 21, 2014) (italicization in original). On follow-up
action and obstacles, see Michael Ramsden, Uniting for MH17, 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 337, 337–
39 (2017).
216.
S.C. Res. 2158, ¶ 7 (May 29, 2014).
217.
Id.
218.
Id. (italicization in original).
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tating terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in October
of 2017 and February of 2018, emphatically denounced the presence of
groups affiliated with Daesh/ISIL in Somalia, and imposed an obligation of
219
cessation upon those NSAs to ensure a return to legality.
After
“[e]xpress[ing] concern about all violations of [IHL] and violations and
abuses of [HR] including by Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to
[Daesh/ISIL],” the Council “call[ed] on all parties to comply immediately
with their obligations under international law and to fulfil their obligations
220
under [IHL] . . . .”
The breach–attribution–consequence syllogism, central in SR, also animated other UNSC resolutions where it directed the application of secondary remedial norms to NSAs. When confronted with complex armed hostilities, the UNSC imposed an obligation of cessation upon state and nonstate
actors. Dealing with the Rwandan conflict, it “[d]emand[ed] that all parties
to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring
221
an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda . . . .”
Handling the repression of civilians in Kosovo, coupled with grave HR and
IHL violations, the UNSC again drew inspiration from international responsibility logic and directed its prescriptions to both states and nonstate actors,
demanding “that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hos222
tilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo . . . .” Similarly, in a different
context the UNSC demanded “that all Somali parties, including movements
and factions,” observe their obligations previously articulated in a ceasefire
223
and disarmament agreement. More recently, it relied on this logic when
addressing escalating violence in Syria by calling on all parties, including
nonstate terrorist actors, to cease any attacks against civilians and civilian
224
objects.
Similarly, in 1999 to 2000, the UNSC, confronted with hostilities transpiring in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), admonished
both Uganda and Rwanda for their outside interferences and prescribed ob-

219.
See S.C. Res. 2408, supra note 76, ¶ 22.
220.
Id. For a more recent resolution, see S.C. Res. 2444, supra note 119, at 1, 7 (condemning a range of unlawful acts by Al-Shabaab and Daesh/ISIL-linked affiliates in Somalia).
221.
S.C. Res. 918, ¶ 1 (May 17, 1994).
222.
S.C. Res. 1199, ¶ 1 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, ¶ 4 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res.
1160, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 1998); see also S.C. Res. 752, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (May 15, 1992) (addressing hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and interferences by neighboring states, as well as prescribing
obligations of cessation).
223.
S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 8 (Mar. 26, 1993); see also S.C. Res. 1010, ¶¶ 1–2 (Aug. 10, 1995)
(demanding that the Bosnian Serb party provide access to UN and ICRC personnel and respect their rights); S.C. Res. 1127, supra note 209, ¶¶ 2–3 (demanding that UNITA observe its
demilitarization duties and provide information on disarmament).
224.
See S.C. Res. 2254, ¶ 13 (Dec. 18, 2015); S.C. Res. 2268, ¶ 3 (Feb. 26, 2016); see
also, e.g., supra nn. 155, 220–222 and infra nn. 226–27, 229, 245 and accompanying text.
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ligations of cessation in line with international responsibility rationale. In
Resolutions 1234 and 1304, it underscored a direct rapprochement between
its principal mandate of maintaining international peace and security and
international legal norms. This precedent has positive implications for the
potential deployment of ICIR under the UNSC’s auspices.
This practice also suggests that the UNSC may enhance international
individual responsibility efforts. Obviously, further adjustments, along with
firmer and clearer formulation of applicable secondary (read: remedial)
norms, might be required in the future. In these specific resolutions, the
UNSC expressed grave concern in the face of widespread IHL and HR violations in the DRC, including acts of and incitement to ethnic hatred committed by various entities, including NSAs. In its operative language, it
called upon all parties to “protect [HR] and to respect [IHL],” expressly
mentioning within its prescriptions the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Additional Protocols of 1977 as well as the Convention on the Prevention
226
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.
Addressing secondary obligations to “all parties” is recurrent in UNSC
resolutions, especially in those dealing with armed conflict, a practice unequivocally covering individuals and nonstate groups (and potentially their
eventual violation of UNSC prescriptions, which could entail ICIR). On this
front, the UNSC’s language is sweeping in its coverage of potential individual and nonstate actors breaching international law. The Council’s resolution-making encompasses “ ‘all parties, including those other than States,’
‘all parties, all movements et [sic] all factions,’ ‘all parties and other inter227
ested persons,’ or ‘all forces and armed groups’ . . . .” It is also addressed
to individually identified nonstate entities, including “ ‘the Serbs of Bosnia,’
‘elements of the Croatian Army,’ ‘the Kosovo Liberation Army or all other
228
groups or individuals’ . . . .” Similarly, Council resolutions have expressly
targeted “ ‘the Burundi Front for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), the
former armed forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR)/Interhamwe and the Alliance of
Democratic Forces,’ ‘the RUF, the civil defence forces and other armed
groups,’ and ‘the Sudanese rebel groups, especially the Movement for Jus229
tice and Equality/Sudan Liberation Movement.’ ” This non-exhaustive re225.
See S.C. Res. 1234, ¶¶ 1–3 (Apr. 9, 1999); see also S.C. Res. 1304, ¶¶ 1–4 (June
16, 2000).
226.
S.C. Res. 1234, supra note 225, ¶ 6; see also S.C. Res. 1304, supra note 225, at
pmbl., ¶ 15.
227.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 338. For a recent example, see S.C. Res 2444, supra note
119, ¶ 47 (demanding that “all parties” facilitate and allow humanitarian aid in Somalia).
228.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 338; see also, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 15 (June 10, 1999)
(demanding that the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups cease
all hostilities and comply with a range of demilitarization requirements).
229.
Cahin, supra note 13, at 338. For a range of relevant resolutions, see ERIC DAVID,
PRINCIPES DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 647 n.2 (5th ed. 2012). For recent examples, see
S.C. Res. 2401, ¶ 7 (Feb. 24, 2018) (demanding that all parties observe a range of international law obligations in Syria); S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2015) (condemning the Houthis’
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view of addressees of UNSC prescriptions illustrates that organ’s willingness to cast a wide net when attributing wrongful conduct to NSAs and imposing secondary obligations resulting from their unlawful acts.
Finally, aside from imposing remedial obligations upon NSAs falling
short of monetary compensation (such as cessation or declarations of
wrongdoing), the UNSC has imposed sanctions against such actors which
were justified by the Council first assigning international responsibility to
them. While the UNSC’s language is not always firmly couched in ICIR
terms in this regard, its relevant resolutions at least operate on a de facto
finding of NSAs’ liability. In these resolutions, the UNSC clearly attributes
some violation of the international legal order to nonstate entities or individuals and then imposes consequences, be they in the form of sanctions or
some other measures. For example, in Resolution 1474, the Council expressly imposed sanctions upon NSAs by “stress[ing] the obligation of all
States and other actors” to observe a previous resolution instituting an arms
230
embargo concerning Somalia. In sanctions resolutions dealing with the
DRC, the UNSC made individuals who recruit child soldiers or attack
231
peacekeepers the object of financial and travel sanctions.
Outside of the more systematic regime of “targeted” sanctions, the
UNSC can also contribute to advancing individual responsibility models
through the adoption of ad hoc measures or sanctions based on the factual
exigencies of any situation with which it is confronted. It bears repeating
that the UNSC already assigns de facto ICIR when it imposes sanctions or
other measures upon individuals and other NSAs. Indeed, UNSC-imposed
sanctions can be reconciled with the ethos of international responsibility
given that the Council is essentially handing down specific consequences
flowing from a NSA’s violation of its international obligation(s). In sanctioning unlawful conduct, the UNSC has, inter alia, imposed:
1. A military and oil embargo, the freezing of funds, possessions
and other economic resources, and refusal of entry and/or
transit of UNITA leaders on or through the territory of any
State stemming from that entity’s violation of its undertakings
232
under the Lusaka Peace Accords;

aggravation of hostilities and calling on all parties to uphold HR in Yemen). See also Fox et
al., supra note 65, at 702 n.274 (calling such practice by the UNSC “almost routine”).
230.
S.C. Res. 1474, ¶ 1 (Apr. 8, 2003) (emphasis added); see also S.C. Res. 1519, ¶ 1
(Dec. 16, 2003). The arms embargo was imposed in S.C. Res. 733, ¶ 5 (Jan. 23, 1992). For a
recent reaffirmation of that arms embargo in the face of evolving security threats, see S.C.
Res. 2444, supra note 119, ¶ 13.
231.
See S.C. Res. 2136, ¶ 4 (Jan. 30, 2014); see also S.C. Res. 1857, ¶¶ 3–4 (Dec. 22,
2008) (applying sanctions to several individuals, including those “operating in the [DRC] and
committing serious violations of international law”).
232.
See Farid Wahid Dahmane, Les Mesures Prises par le Conseil de Sécurité contre
les Entités Non-étatiques, 11 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARE
227, 234 (1999).
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2. Similar measures “with respect to Usama bin Laden, members
of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with
233
them,” identified by name;
3. Military and logistical embargoes targeting armed groups and
foreign militias operating on the DRC’s territory, especially in
234
Kivu and Ituri, and against several NSAs and armed groups
235
236
carrying out activities in Liberia and in Darfur; and
4. Various measures concerning serious IHL and HR abuses by
237
the above entities and other NSAs.
Similarly, the UNSC has directed with relative frequency that armed opposition groups refrain from engaging in various conducts during or in the
wake of armed conflict, such as disregarding HR norms, violating IHL, or
238
breaching peace accords. Moreover, the Council’s specific demands of
such groups have varied greatly—running the gamut from observing
HR/IHL obligations to respecting electoral outcomes—and have targeted
239
240
241
NSAs in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Central African Repub242
243
244
245
lic, the DRC, Syria, and the former Yugoslavia.
233.
See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 211, ¶ 2.
234.
See S.C. Res. 1493 (July 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1552 (July 27, 2004); S.C. Res. 1596
(Apr. 18, 2005).
235.
See S.C. Res. 1521 (Dec. 22, 2003); see also S.C. Res. 2237, ¶ 1 (Sept. 2, 2015)
(renewing the arms embargo regarding NSAs in Liberia).
236.
See S.C. Res. 1556 (July 30, 2004). On the recent use of embargoes in the counterterrorism context, see S.C. Res. 2370, supra note 134, ¶¶ 3–4.
237.
The UN Secretary-General also formulated a proposal that targeted measures be
directed against the military and political leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka, U.N.
Doc. S/2006/1006, ¶ 63 (Dec. 20, 2005).
238.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2113, ¶¶ 4, 15–17 (July 30, 2013) (condemning HR and IHL
violations in Sudan); S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013) (expressing concern regarding HR
and IHL violations in the DRC, and calling for accountability); S.C. Res. 1964, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22,
2010) (condemning HR transgressions in Somalia, and calling for accountability); S.C. Res.
1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (requiring all groups in Sudan to observe HR and IHL duties); S.C.
Res. 1577, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (devising measures concerning those responsible for HR violations in Burundi); S.C. Res. 1509, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19, 2003) (requiring parties in Liberia to observed their duties under the peace and ceasefire accords).
239.
S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998) (requiring that “Afghan factions put an end to
discrimination against girls and women and other violations [of HR]”).
240.
S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 4 (July 15, 1993) (demanding that “UNITA accept unreservedly
the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the ‘Acordos de Paz’;”).
241.
S.C. Res. 792, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 1992) (demanding “that the PDK fulfil immediately its
obligations under the Paris Agreements;”).
242.
S.C. Res. 2121, ¶ 15 (Oct. 10, 2013) (demanding “that all armed groups, in particular Sekela elements[,] prevent the recruitment and use of children,”).
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These sanctions, including the increasingly frequent freezing of assets
in counterterrorism contexts, again demonstrate that ICIR’s effective deployment remains largely dependent on state action. By the same token, as
this pattern of UNSC practice also suggests—particularly but not exclusively in the case of UNITA—when armed opposition groups disregard the
Council’s directives, they increasingly become subject to sanctions handed
246
down by that organ. At least upon first glance, there is a direct consequence for violating international law (even if it falls short of pecuniary
compensation), an outcome which is eminently reconcilable with the essence of international responsibility.
Beyond sanctions, in its application of SR norms, the UNSC has interpreted its functions very broadly and imposed far-reaching and diversified
secondary obligations flowing from its findings of illegality. It may be pondered why similar creative and expansive solutions could not animate its
imposition of secondary norms of individual responsibility flowing from
NSAs’ violations of primary obligations. Of course, the scale, duration,
magnitude, authorship, and effects of relevant breaches will undoubtedly
inform the scope of UNSC responses to infringements. Nevertheless, the
central idea is that the UNSC is less constrained in selecting options from its
remedial toolbox when compared with the avenues available to an injured
state attempting to implement SR unilaterally.
A case in point is the UNSC’s institution of the indemnity fund and UN
Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) following Iraq’s unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait, which largely derived from SR and U.S. mass
247
tort claims theory. Similar models could be envisaged to facilitate and
streamline the administration of claims resulting from ICIR for terrorism, at

243.
S.C. Res. 1417, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2002) (reaffirming that the UNSC “holds the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma, as the de facto authority, responsible to bring to
an end all extrajudicial executions, [HR] violations and arbitrary harassment of civilians in
Kisangani,”).
244.
S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning “widespread violations [of HR
and IHL]” by “armed groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well
as all grave violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable
international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on schools
and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment and use as human
shields;”).
245.
S.C. Res. 752, supra note 222, ¶ 1 (demanding “that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, [and] respect immediately
and fully the cease-fire”).
246.
See, e.g., Nigel D. White, Sanctions Against Non-State Actors, in COERCIVE
DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 148–49 (Natalino Ronzitti ed.,
2016).
247.
On these aspects and relevant UNSC resolutions, see PROULX, supra note 23, at
197–98, 299. See also PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 202–05.
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least regarding massive or large-scale violations perpetrated by entities such
248
as Daesh/ISIL.

V. The Way Forward: Toward a Flawed but Workable Model?
There is every indication that the scope of some UNSC resolutions
might extend beyond the immediate matters on which the Council is deciding, thereby enjoying more pervasive, general obligation-setting qualities.
As demonstrated above, the Council’s role in enforcing international legal
norms and implementing individual responsibility remains intimately tied to
its formulation of primary obligations (read: “quasi-legislative” function).
Otherwise put, there is great validity, continuity, and logic to the idea that,
once the UNSC promulgates a primary norm binding on states and/or NSAs,
it could then proceed to implement and enforce it in the event of its violation by a subject of the UNSC’s resolutions (or by an actor whose conduct is
captured under the Council’s prescriptions). More broadly, this synergy between UNSC “quasi-legislation” and implementation has also had an impact
on general international law, particularly in the counterterrorism context but
249
also beyond.
This approach might strike some as flat-out undesirable primarily because the UNSC might be perceived as unable to set obligations prospectively under customary international law, or because its structural make-up
might seemingly make it ill-equipped to engage in lawmaking. There is
nonetheless evidence beyond the present account that the UNSC is an active
lawmaking entity. For example, a recent and insightful study analyzing a
compiled data set of all UNSC resolutions from 1990 to 2013 evinces that
organ’s undeniable contribution to shaping customary international law on
obligations related to non-international armed conflicts (that is, on NSAs’
HR obligations, the binding nature of peace agreements in such conflicts,
and the importance of holding post-conflict elections in the affected
250
states).
248.
See also Cahin, supra note 13, at 340 (discussing UNSC measures against Al
Qaeda, the Taliban and other nonstate terrorist actors, and remarking that “[f]rom a technical
point of view, the international management of an indemnity fund, composed of blocked
funds and assets, is perfectly foreseeable”).
249.
See, e.g., Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action, supra note 196;
Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International
Legal System, supra note 196; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council as Enforcer of
Human Rights, in SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 36 (Bardo Fassbender ed., 2011). For a nuanced and critical take, see
Koskenniemi, supra note 147. On the various limitations of the UNSC’s “legislative” functions in counterterrorism matters, see generally Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martínez, The Legislative Role of the Security Council in Its Fight Against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical
Limits, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 333 (2008).
250.
See Fox et al., supra note 65, at 649–731. For a more dated, cynical view on the
UNSC’s ability to alter existing rules of international law, see Wellens, supra note 96, at 48–
50.
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A. Prospects and Limits:
International Civil Individual Responsibility as a Way Forward?
The model advocated in this Article is by no means perfect and may
well generate arbitrary and selective application of international legal norms
in some circumstances. The UNSC’s institutional features might ultimately
jeopardize the “general” character of the proposed regime of individual civil
responsibility advertised in this Article’s title. This reality is exacerbated by
the fact that the Council’s lawmaking pattern and use of international law
can mostly be characterized as piecemeal, random, and arbitrary. Consequently, the UNSC should not be turned to as a reliable, uniform, or evenly
fair dispenser of international law. For one thing, affording the UNSC with
such normative power, both in terms of setting primary obligations of conduct and enforcing secondary norms of liability against NSAs, might unduly
vest powerful states with the ability to determine issues of ICIR to the detriment of the developing world. Setting aside these political dimensions,
even in situations where the UNSC intervenes to actuate individual responsibility, the twin problems of enforcement and implementation frequently
constitute a considerable stumbling block to securing an effective remedy.
This is particularly true when the Council targets specific terrorist organizations (such as Daesh/ISIL and Al-Shabaab) that may elude enforcement
mechanisms for various reasons. In this light, the question remains whether
the prospect of instituting individual responsibility in international law is
prompted by the absence of alternative targets of liability as opposed to being driven by existing doctrine. It may be that in the absence of effective
control by a territorial state over a terrorist group, the UNSC may be called
upon to establish that group’s international responsibility. It may also be
that this group does not lend itself to the imposition of quasi-SR for a range
of reasons, but that some of its key members have been satisfactorily identified as perpetrators of unlawful acts. In such a scenario, the UNSC could
again play a role in determining those individuals’ international responsibility.
However, enforcement and implementation problems are true of many
facets of international law, including, in some cases, when an injured state
attempts to implement SR unilaterally in the context of diplomatic relations.
Power politics or the prospect of disrupting a previously established pattern
of reciprocal relations between the injured and wrongdoing states might
251
preclude the former from securing meaningful redress against the latter.
Consequently, there might be something inherently attractive about submitting some unresolved questions of international responsibility—be they of
an individual or interstate nature—for judicial determination by formal dis-

251.
For a compatible argument, see Karl Zamanek, Does the Prospect of Incurring Responsibility Improve the Observance of International Law?, in INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 125,
129.
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pute settlement bodies. Quarrelling parties may find comfort in the process
of de-politicizing their dispute through formal adjudication, though not every case is destined (nor suited) for such a fate. Furthermore, even formal
dispute settlement by international courts or tribunals may not always yield
252
effective enforcement results.
There is an element of jurisdictional parity between disputing states,
exemplified by the consensual nature of international dispute settlement (or
interstate negotiations). This element of parity may be absent in dispute settlement proceedings concerning the implementation of ICIR, for example in
cases before regional HR courts and domestic tribunals. This same parity
may also be absent in other means of implementation of ICIR, for example
when the UNSC establishes the liability of NSAs and imposes resulting
secondary obligations. In such scenarios, the object of liability—that is, an
individual or group—may not have consented to the jurisdiction of the decision-making entity (or to its decisional power, more broadly). Here, the individual’s or group’s inability to consent may be attributable to the fact that
the decision-making entity’s prescriptions are compulsory, such as when the
UNSC hands down binding measures or sanctions. Alternatively, the inability to consent might be explained by the fact that the decision-making entity
is a jurisdictional body of a compulsory or general nature which can compel
the performance of secondary obligations, such as a domestic court. This
scenario stands in sharp contrast to the consent-based jurisdictional nature
of interstate dispute settlement. This is not to mention that NSAs do not
have standing to appear before many non-criminal international tribunals.
Interestingly, consent to jurisdiction is also typically present in socalled “mixed” disputes between investors and the host states of their in253
vestments. This makes the settlement of some ICIR disputes qualitatively
252.
On the recent saga surrounding the South China Sea dispute, see, for example, Feng
Zhang, The Paradox at the Heart of the South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POLICY (July 28,
2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/can-china-actually-be-benefiting-from-southchina-sea-ruling-paradox-hague-philippines/; Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’ Awards, 8 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 388 (2017). Similarly,
following Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep.
624 (Nov. 19), Colombia refused to abide by some aspects of the ruling and withdrew from
the Pact of Bogotá, leading to a second case instituted by Nicaragua alleging violations of its
sovereign rights in its maritime spaces. The Court asserted jurisdiction to hear the merits. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v.
Colom.), Preliminary Objections, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Mar. 17). It must be stressed, however,
that the rate of compliance with state-to-state arbitral awards and ICJ decisions is generally
high. See, e.g., Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the
International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815 (2007).
253.
However, there is arguably no parity between a foreign investor and the host state
after the capital is invested or, at least, considerably diminishing bargaining power for the investor “[u]nless . . . both sides appreciate that if negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration will
follow.” W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but
Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV. 185, 190–91 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Sergio
Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 369 (2018). For an earlier, empirically-based assess-
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different than more “traditional” international dispute settlement proceedings. Moreover, the notion of enforcement and its relevance take on a different complexion in the context of SR as opposed to ICIR. For instance,
determinations of SR have implications beyond available remedies such as
reputational costs for the concerned state(s), the availability of countermeasures in apposite cases, and an impact on diplomatic relations, all absent
254
features in the ICIR scenario. That said, enforcement and compliance issues might arise across the full spectrum of disputes and implementation
models of international responsibility (state-based or individual in both judicial and non-judicial contexts), irrespective of jurisdictional considerations.
In addition, one overarching objective of this account was to explore international individual responsibility models beyond the UN “targeted” (or
“smart”) sanctions regime. The aim was also to add to the voluminous Kadi
literature in a complementary fashion and without fully unpacking all poten255
tial HR considerations. That said, inspiration will need to be drawn from
the UNSC sanctions regime in building an eventual ICIR regime. The
UNSC sanctions regime offers some points of rapprochement but also considerable differences. After all, the paramount objective of the “smart” sanctions regime bears reemphasis—namely, to induce individuals to align their
behavior with what is required by international law and previous UNSC
256
resolutions. Yet, this system is seriously deficient from a due process perspective. Invariably, the question of due process should feature centrally in
the development and formulation of a general ICIR regime, especially if the

ment, see Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector
in Developing Countries, 41 INT’L ORG. 609 (1987).
254.
There is a complicated relationship between interstate enforcement measures, such
as ICJ proceedings and countermeasures, and their potential relevance to inducing restitution
and/or compensation for the benefit of individual victims of wrongful acts—an area where
relevant practice is scarce. See Randelzhofer & Tomuschat, supra note 24; see also
CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–12
(2005). On the reputational costs of states’ conduct, see generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
255.
The Kadi literature primarily centers on two cases handed down by the European
Union’s (“EU”) judiciary, which addressed the hierarchy between general principles of EU
law and international legal norms. The decisions reviewed the legality of European Commission measures imposing sanctions on individuals who had been listed by the UN Sanctions
Committee. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The U.N. Terrorist
Sanctions Regime After Kadi II, 6 AMSTERDAM L.F. 51 (2014); KADI ON TRIAL: A
MULTIFACETED ANALYSIS OF THE KADI TRIAL (Matej Avbelj et al. eds., 2014); Joris Larik,
The Kadi Saga as a Tale of ‘Strict Observance’ of International Law: Obligations Under the
UN Charter, Targeted Sanctions and Judicial Review in the European Union, 61 NETH. INT’L
L. REV. 23 (2014); Francesco Francioni, The Right of Access to Justice to Challenge the Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions: After-Thoughts on Kadi, in FROM BILATERALISM TO
COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 908 (Ulrich Fastenrath
et al. eds., 2011).
256.
See PETERS, supra note 3, at 94.
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UNSC is involved in making determinations of unlawful conduct and im257
plementing international responsibility and its consequences.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of developing a general ICIR
regime by engaging international institutions lies in the contributions the
UNSC could make in filling a normative, regulatory, and enforcement void.
258
Particularly relevant is the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) regime,
which grants U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over cases in which foreign
claimants allege violations of customary international law rules by other in259
dividuals or legal persons. This model clearly shows that ICIR can theoretically be facilitated and enforced by enlisting the assistance of domestic
jurisdictions. This has resulted in both private persons and transnational
corporations being sued, often involving criminal offenses at the core whose
260
civil dimensions were dealt with by U.S. courts under ATCA. Inherent in
the U.S. courts’ treatment of ATCA cases is the notion that individuals and
other NSAs bear obligations under international law. As a corollary, the
breach of such substantive norms remains guided by international law and
presupposes the imposition of international responsibility upon individuals
261
and other NSAs.
In the Alvarez-Machain case, the U.S. Supreme Court set out two considerable restrictions on the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under ATCA. In
short, in any case, the international law norm that is the object of the suit
262
under ATCA must be specific and universally recognized. More recently,
a suit was brought under ATCA in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
alleging that Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiaries aided and abetted the
Nigerian government in perpetrating serious HR violations. In deciding the
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for interna-

257.
In the context of “targeted” sanctions, see generally Bardo Fassbender, Targeted
Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights, 3 INT’L ORG. L. REV.
437 (2006); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 105, at 109–13; supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
258.
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also supra nn. 4, 207, and
accompanying text.
259.
This regime has generated considerable jurisprudence and settlements. See generally David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual Accountability in International Law, 46 STAN. J. INT’L L. 121 (2010).
260.
For instance, in 1995 the Serbian leader .DUDGåLüZDVRUGHUHGWRFRPSHQVDWH%Rsnian claimants to the tune of $745 million for international crimes perpetrated in Bosnia. The
U.S. Court of Appeals stressed that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of the state or only as private individuals.” See .DGLF Y .DUDGåLü, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also
PETERS, supra note 3, at 162–64.
261.
See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 116 (equating this process with the imposition of
“public law” responsibility).
262.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
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263

tional crimes, . . . .” Therefore, the Second Circuit said that “insofar as
plaintiffs bring claims under the [ATCA] against corporations, plaintiffs fail
to allege violations of the law of nations, and plaintiffs’ claims fall outside
264
the limited jurisdiction provided by the [ATCA].” In other words, under
this approach, which was endorsed in international jurisprudence, the linchpin of the analysis concerned the responsibility of natural, but not legal, persons. Consequently, courts were more inclined to hold the leaders of business entities accountable for HR violations as opposed to imposing liability
265
upon the enterprises themselves.
Ultimately, on appeal in Kiobel, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals—albeit on different grounds—concluding
266
that ATCA does not grant jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims. Thus,
this precedent arguably left the question of corporate liability under ATCA
open. The more recent Jesner v. Arab Bank decision revisited the debate
over corporate liability, with the Supreme Court holding that foreign corpo267
rations cannot be sued under ATCA. However, it is likely that the case
failed to resolve the issue of corporate liability of U.S. corporations given
that the ruling was limited to foreign corporations. Therefore, this series of
precedents creates a space in which the UNSC may play a role in bolstering
transnational and international individual responsibility regimes.
Another recent development lending further support to the arguments
advanced above lies in the rejection by the European Court of Human
268
Rights (the “ECtHR”) of the notion of universal civil jurisdiction. An in263.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
264.
Id.
265.
See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 163.
266.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013). For further discussion about the case, see, for example, Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601 (2013); Julian G.
Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute,
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2013).
267.
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). However, in recent years,
the United States has considerably expanded civil liability for foreign terrorist acts against
U.S. nationals under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, espousing a more nationalist approach to ICIR. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Transformation of Human
Rights Litigation: The Alien Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA, 24 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285 (2017) (arguing that the “near demise” of ATCA, coupled with
“the growth of anti-terrorism legislation” in the United States, “represent a turn away from a
cosmopolitan vision of building a global legal order, in which all states protect human rights
regardless of nationality”).
268.
This concept, also referred to as “universal tort jurisdiction,” operates without the
need to establish a jurisdictional nexus between the decisional forum and the international law
violation. See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 2015);
see also Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is It Legal? Is It Desirable?, 99
ASIL PROC. 123, 123 (2005) (defining universal civil/tort jurisdiction “as the principle under
which civil proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the
unlawful conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the
grounds that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern.”); Donald Francis Do-
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herently attractive argument might be that the future of such jurisdiction is
primarily domestic. This militates in favor of broader involvement of national jurisdictions through concepts such as universal jurisdiction for torts
or civil wrongdoing—just like the future of international criminal justice
might also be predominantly municipal in implementation and enforce269
270
ment. Despite the potential availability of universal civil jurisdiction,
the international legal system still has a role to play, possibly an important
one. In the Naït-Liman case, the ECtHR’s Chamber was confronted with an
attempt by a refugee to seize a Swiss court with a civil claim for damages
resulting from torture allegedly sustained in Tunisia after his efforts to vindicate his rights before Swiss courts were rejected. Amongst relevant issues,
the Chamber was called upon to determine whether universal civil jurisdiction constituted a requirement under international law, ultimately holding
that it was not following a comparative inquiry. Consequently, the complainant’s right of access to a tribunal had not been violated under the Euro271
pean Convention of Human Rights.
On appeal, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR focused on one key issue
for present purposes, namely, whether Switzerland had an obligation under
international law to entertain the applicant’s civil claim. The Grand Chamber affirmed the Chamber’s ruling that states enjoy seemingly unfettered
appreciation in taking or declining jurisdiction over civil suits concerning
272
extraterritorial torts, even where the unlawful act breaches a jus cogens
norm. Indeed, the Court investigated whether Switzerland was bound to
acknowledge universal civil jurisdiction for torture claims under customary
273
international law or conventional law. When analyzing customary law, the
Court observed that, out of the legal systems of the thirty-nine member
274
states studied, only the Netherlands recognizes universal civil jurisdiction.
novan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM.
J. INT’L L. 142 (2006); Donald Francis Donovan, Universal Civil Jurisdiction–The Next Frontier?, 99 ASIL PROC. 117 (2005).
269.
For a compatible argument in the counterterrorism field, see Proulx, supra note 175
(arguing that ICL may be best pursued through a “transnational network of criminal and civil
law”).
270.
It should be stressed that the existence of this concept is still highly debated. For
the Institute of International Law’s recent work on the matter, see Andreas Bucher, Universal
Civil Jurisdiction with Regard to Reparation for International Crimes, 76 Y.B. INST. INT’L L.
1, 7–37 (2015) (mapping out still emergent domestic practices involving reparations sought by
and against individuals and against corporate entities).
271.
See Naït-Liman v. Switzerland, App. No. 51357/07, Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. June
21, 2016). For a critical take on the judgment, see Devika Hovell, The Authority of Universal
Jurisdiction, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 427, 450–53 (2018).
272.
See Cedric Ryngaert, Note and Comment, From Universal Civil Jurisdiction to Forum for Necessity: Reflections on the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in
Nait-Liman, 100 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 782, 805 (2017).
273.
Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], App. No. 51357/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 45–66 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Mar. 15, 2018) (reviewing relevant international law sources).
274.
Id. ¶ 183.
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While the Court identified limited legal avenues in Canada and the United
States enabling claimants to bring civil actions in the context of criminal
275
proceedings, it noted the absence of a crystalized customary norm that
would have obligated the Swiss courts to hear the applicant’s case (though it
276
underscored that relevant practice was evolving).
The Court then arrived at a similar conclusion under treaty law. It first
observed that the Committee against Torture stressed an expansive interpretation of Article 14 of UNCAT, which presumably covers civil claims alleg277
ing acts of torture perpetrated outside the forum’s territory. That said, the
Court found that both the Committee’s practice and the travaux préparatoires of UNCAT did not ground a legal obligation that Switzerland make
278
its domestic courts available to the applicant. The Court was nonetheless
cautious to emphasize that its holding did “not call into question the broad
consensus within the international community on the existence of a right for
279
victims of acts of torture to obtain appropriate and effective redress, . . . .”
It encouraged states to open up such legal avenues and applauded those that
280
did so. Underscoring the “dynamic nature of this area,” the Court accepted the possibility that international law might evolve in this field and invited
states “to take account in their legal orders of any developments facilitating
effective implementation of the right to compensation for acts of tor281
ture . . . .”
When considered in tandem with recent ATCA jurisprudence, the NaïtLiman precedent disappointed HR proponents. This is especially true in the
post-Kiobel legal landscape, with this line of cases having considerably limited available legal options for extraterritorial civil claims. In fact, these de275.
Id. ¶ 184.
276.
Id. ¶ 187.
277.
Id. ¶¶ 188–98; see also UNCAT, supra note 33; text accompanying supra note 33.
For one example of domestic implementation of this provision, see Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (“TVPA”) (instituting a right of
“civil action” in U.S. courts against any individual having committed “torture” or “extrajudicial killing”). For a pre-Naït-Liman account arguing that Article 14 of UNCAT requires—and
TVPA provides for—universal civil jurisdiction, see Christopher Keith Hall, The Duty of
States Parties to the Convention against Torture to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to
Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 931–937
(2007).
278.
Naït-Liman [GC], ¶¶ 188–98.
279.
Id. ¶ 218; see also id., ¶ 97.
280.
Id.
281.
Id. ¶ 220. It must be recalled that in a previous judgment, exhibiting more laconic
reasoning on this point, the Court concluded that the question whether UNCAT “has given
right to universal civil jurisdiction” was “far from settled.” Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-I
Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, ¶ 208. For a critique of the Chamber’s Naït-Liman judgment, which still holds
true regarding the Grand Chamber’s judgment, see Hovell, supra note 271, at 450–53. The
outcome reached by the Grand Chamber might be contrasted with its earlier assertion that
“[e]veryone has the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought
before a court or tribunal.” See Naït-Liman [GC], ¶ 113.
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velopments and the ECtHR’s reasoning might induce states to reject universal civil jurisdiction. It may also affect the relevant opinio juris adversely
and weaken the jus cogens character of the prohibition against torture, as
282
forewarned by the dissenting judges in the Chamber’s judgment. These
developments again demonstrate that, while there is growing consensus that
certain unlawful acts carried out by individuals and NSAs are proscribed in
international law, the legal avenues to enforce their resulting liability are
scarce (at least domestically), and the content of both primary and secondary norms is ill-defined concerning certain would-be obligations. As a result, some victims of internationally wrongful acts might be left without
standing to enforce their rights and/or access civil remedies (and an appropriate forum). Therefore, this Article has advocated that we consider turning
to international institutions in apposite contexts, particularly the UNSC, to
address the normative, regulatory, and enforcement gaps left in the realm of
ICIR. While this is by no means an ideal or even consistently reliable solution, there is evidence that the UNSC can play a role in shaping and defining relevant primary norms of behavior binding individuals and NSAs in
certain areas. It can also play a role in enforcing those and other existing
norms through sanctions and other measures. In so doing, the UNSC already
disposes of a rich corpus of international legal tools to draw from, including
SR law and the broader framework of international responsibility.

B. A Return to Familiar but Limited Notions
Invoking international responsibility’s primary-secondary mechanics
provides the UNSC with the powerful language (and notions) of attribution,
283
responsibility, reparation, cessation, and return to legality. Moreover, the
UNSC can bolster its findings of illegality with sanctions in appropriate
cases, should its formulated obligations of cessation and non-repetition fail
to generate the desired compliance pull. These UNSC measures can become
robust and complementary enforcement mechanisms, which may enlist the
284
support of domestic jurisdictions for more effective implementation. Ultimately, the UNSC may decide to turn to a more ambitious model of “institutionalized” reparation for wrongful acts committed by NSAs. For exam282.
But, for a sympathetic take on the outcome reached by the Chamber, see Ryngaert,
supra note 272, at 783 (expressing doubt about the existence, legality, or desirability of an
international legal rule that would oblige states to acknowledge universal civil jurisdiction).
283.
See PETERS, supra note 3, at 164–66 (arguing that the “legal possibility of imposing secondary international legal obligations on individuals as well as primary obligations
should be welcomed from an abstract perspective in principle. . . . [As it] represents a fair corollary to the progressive unfolding of individual rights and would consolidate the legal status
of the individual as a primary subject of international law.” But, adopting a more nuanced and
practical stance in assessing the usefulness of such approach).
284.
See, e.g., NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Domestic Implementation of UN Sanctions, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER
STATES 63 (Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
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ple, it may do so by setting up an indemnity fund and accompanying commission to handle mass claims, which might be suited to redress large-scale
and/or repeated terrorism, along with systematic and massive HR/IHL violations by armed opposition groups within territories under their control.
Yet, we must be cautious not to overstate the UNSC’s potential contributions. The enforcement and implementation of individual responsibility
remain challenging in many terrorism scenarios. These concerns may be
partly assuaged by the adoption of UNSC “targeted” sanctions and
arms/trade embargoes. Yet, such measures might fail to acquire the requisite
traction to be effective, especially when terrorists operate in fragile or failed
states or wield exclusive control over a territorial enclave. Furthermore, a
healthy dose of pragmatism is apposite. The UNSC’s process is not without
its imperfections, and its attribution of individual responsibility may be subject to factual errors. For instance, in 2004, it attributed the Madrid terrorist
285
attacks to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”). Subsequently, the UNSC’s
factual determination and related finding of responsibility were proven to be
286
erroneous. This precedent exposes the UNSC’s blind spots and potential
overbreadth in determining questions of international responsibility. It further reinforces the necessity that due process safeguards be carefully considered and built into any general ICIR regime involving that organ as key
decisionmaker.
Conversely, the fact that the UNSC’s process remains considerably different than that used by courts does not, in and of itself, dispossess the
Council of the ability to make “quasi-judicial” determinations or engage in
287
dispute settlement under the UN Charter. In fact, despite the call for
greater fact-finding on its part in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful
288
Settlement of International Disputes and the wording of Chapter VI of the
UN Charter, it would be unrealistic to expect the UNSC to act like a court of

285.
S.C. Res. 1530, ¶ 1 (Mar. 11, 2004).
286.
See Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibility and the United Nations Charter, supra note
213, at 129–30; see also Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 143, at 124; Thérèse O’Donnell, Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 945 (2006).
287.
See, e.g., ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra
note 126, at 416–24. On the exercise of the UNSC’s “quasi-judicial” powers, see generally
Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly,
58 AM. J. INT’L L. 960 (1964); PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 126–36. On
the question of due process and UNSC decision-making, see supra nn. 123, 257; infra note
289.
288.
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes art. 2, ¶
4(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10, annex (Nov. 15, 1982) (calling upon states to “[c]onsider making greater use of the fact-finding capacity of the Security Council in accordance with the
Charter;”). On the UNSC’s fact-finding role, see generally Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Le
Traitement des Différends Internationaux par le Conseil de Sécurité, 85 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 40 (1954).
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law, in both process and substance. However, that is a far cry from surmising that no due process concerns whatsoever can be accommodated and
ultimately incorporated into an eventual general ICIR regime.
On balance, a more robust individual accountability model for terrorism
will likely find steadier footing amidst a comprehensive strategy, entailing a
network of multi-leveled relationships of responsibility and involving various actors as well as legal and political processes. This is precisely the strategy advocated and reaffirmed by the UNSC in its action against Daesh/ISIL,
for example, which also features a central role for states and their obliga290
tions in the international responsibility calculus.
After all, in the Bosnian Genocide Case, the ICJ moved toward a multilateral expectation that several states, “each complying with its obligation to
prevent” where a single state’s efforts have fallen short, might produce the
291
desired outcome of preventing genocide. This rationale is transposable to
terrorism prevention and other important present-day transnational security
concerns. The security imperatives of a post-9/11 world and individual responsibility mechanisms will be enhanced if many states and other actors
work in concert. This is against the backdrop of interactive, concurrently
applicable, and sometimes mutually reinforcing legal regimes. In the “targeted sanctions” field, for instance, at least three possible scenarios of “parallelism” can be identified in which UNSC mandates and ICC action can
intersect and lead to varying degrees of formal or informal synergy. These
situations of “parallelism” might signal that both distinct—but parallel—
legal regimes have their source in UNSC action and address different threats
but focus on the same individuals; or address the same threat and are imposed simultaneously; or co-exist simultaneously but have a different
292
origin.
Looking to the future, many legal challenges abound, not least the question of how the proposed model would accommodate key HR and procedural guarantees (such as due process). While this contribution has focused on
some legal tools available to the UNSC in implementing individual respon-

289.
But cf. Keith Harpher, Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as a Court and Legislature?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 103 (1994) (advocating that inquiries should be pursued to determine whether the UNSC acted appropriately as a
court when it exercises seemingly similar functions, including through the adoption of procedural rules to promote due process and regulate the admissibility/authenticity of evidence,
affording parties the ability to be heard, preventing interested parties from self-judging their
own cases, striking equality of arms amongst litigants, and publishing the UNSC’s reasons for
its decisions).
290.
See Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution, supra note 98, at 308–11, 338.
291.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26).
292.
See Larissa van den Herik, The Individualization of Enforcement in International
Law: Exploring the Interplay between United Nations Targeted Sanctions and International
Criminal Proceedings, in THE PURSUIT OF A BRAVE NEW WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
234 (Tiyanjana Maluwa et al. eds., 2017).
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sibility, thinking more broadly about this topic requires grappling with other
challenging and unpleasant questions. For instance, how can we persuade
armed opposition groups/terrorist factions that wield territorial control and
have set up their own courts and/or civil administrations (for example,
293
Daesh/ISIL or the Taliban) to uphold fundamental IHL and HR standards?
Holding an armed opposition group responsible for IHL and HR violations
might be the only way to secure the rights of locals where the nonstate
294
group has taken control over a given territory from the territorial state. Is
partial, patchy, or even rare compliance with relevant legal standards on
their part better than none at all?
Setting aside the thorny issue of enforcement, there is little doubt that
such nonstate entities are responsible for upholding basic international law
295
protections and could be held legally accountable if they fail to do so.
While the state-centric nature of contemporary international law might pose
obstacles to a more progressive framework to deal with armed opposition
groups, there are compelling policy and legal reasons why such actors
296
should be liable to pay reparations for IHL and HR violations. How can
we make a convincing case to such NSAs regarding the observance of international law? How effective or realistic would persuasion be in such scenarios? Should that be a consideration at all and, if so, what does that tell us
about the prospect of developing an ICIR regime? If the struggle over the
elaboration of corporate liability frameworks has taught us anything, it is
297
that a softer, less legalistic approach might be the way forward. Is that
293.
The classical, but perhaps outdated, view was that nonstate armed groups were not
legally bound to uphold HR guarantees codified in treaties as opposed to IHL standards. See
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. to the Commission on Human Rights: Minimum Humanitarian
Standards, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, ¶ 59 (Jan. 5, 1998). There is now some traction for the
idea that NSAs, armed opposition groups, and de facto regimes should be bound by HR standards. See generally, e.g., KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS
UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2017); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of NonState Actors in Conflict Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491 (2006); Asbjørn Eide et al.,
Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 215 (1995); Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 81 (1999); Michael Schoiswohl, De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations—The
Twilight of Public International Law?, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 45 (2003).
294.
See, e.g., International Law Association Non State Actor Committee Washington
Conference, supra note 133, at 6; see also Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INT’L
L. STUD. 483, 487 n.15 (2016).
295.
See, e.g., RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NON-STATE ACTOR IN ARMED CONFLICT AND
THE MARKET PLACE (Noemi Gal-Or et al. eds., 2015).
296.
See, e.g., Paloma Blázquez Rodríguez, Does an Armed Group Have an Obligation
to Provide Reparations to its Victims? Construing an Obligation to Provide Reparations for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 406.
297.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. However, it is nonetheless encouraging
that the HR Council is attempting to elaborate an international, legally-binding instrument on
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middle-ground approach satisfying? Unfortunately, these are only some of
the many legal complexities related to the amorphous threats posed by “terrorists” and other subversive NSAs. These queries warrant serious consideration in seeking richer accountability models.

VI. Conclusion
There are compelling legal, political, policy, and moral reasons to enhance frameworks for the establishment and enforcement of the legal accountability of individuals and NSAs in international law. A fundamental
motivation for this agenda is that wrongful conduct should not go unaddressed. Violations of international legal obligations should not go unsanctioned. An equally principled reason for turning international legal
minds to this question is the need to resolve a significant tension between an
important objective and an arguably regressive trend.
On one hand, there is an increasing demand—some might argue a necessity—to articulate more robust international responsibility standards to
address the subversive acts of individuals and NSAs, ranging from terrorists
to transnational corporations. This impetus cuts across a vast range of international law regimes and is evidenced by the gradual recognition that individuals and nonstate groups can assume a broader set of international obligations. The flipside to this reality is that there should be a corresponding
increase in their potential liability for wrongdoing. The ILC’s own work has
opened the door to this possibility. This proposition is also supported by
myriad factors, including the evolving international legal personality of
nonstate entities and its implications for international law, the need to identify alternative targets of liability when a territorial state simply cannot be
blamed, doctrinal and practical reasons for circumscribing the role and accountability of NSAs on the international plane, etc. On the other hand, considerable obstacles remain in better defining a would-be regime to govern

transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to HR. See Human
Rights Council, Draft Res. 26/. . . U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014); Human
Rights Council, Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). In fact, the recently
leaked “zero draft” of the would-be treaty uses legally-binding language regarding civil liability. See Human Rights Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises
(July 16, 2018), at 2–3, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf. But see Ioana Cismas & Sarah Macrory, The Business
and Human Rights Regime Under International Law: Remedy Without Law?, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 8, at 222 (arguing that, while there is broad agreement that business entities must
provide reparation for HR violations, the content of primary norms they must observe is illdefined and/or absent). Recent scholarly proposals include a call for the creation of an International Court of Civil Justice to handle complex transnational civil disputes to hold multinational corporations liable for causing large-scale harm to persons, their livelihood, and the
environment in developing countries. See MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE (2019).
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the international responsibility of individuals and NSAs, chief among them
being the lack of definition of relevant primary norms and uncertainty surrounding the mechanics of secondary remedial norms. What is more, recent
American and European jurisprudence has called into question the existence
of universal civil jurisdiction, which represents a setback for the development of international individual responsibility beyond criminal liability.
Despite this resistance, however, this is a propitious moment for the international community to move forward on ICIR. As demonstrated in this
Article, several key building blocks are already in place. The international
obligations of individuals and other NSAs can be traced back to several
UNSC resolutions and treaties. The elaboration of a general ICIR regime
also makes good policy and legal sense for reasons canvassed above. It
would not only generate primary normative content but also help better define the application of secondary norms governing breaches of international
law authored by individuals and NSAs. Moreover, such a regime would aim
to palliate the considerable normative and enforcement gaps created by the
abovementioned jurisprudence on universal civil jurisdiction. The regime’s
would-be conceptual and theoretical foundations are also defensible when
framed within the doctrine of international responsibility, broadly understood. As shown above, there is considerable fluidity and malleability in
transposing and adapting concepts from international responsibility discourse (including SR norms) to the universe of NSAs. Granted, this exercise
is accompanied by a series of caveats, not least the fact that there are important qualitative differences between states and NSAs that must be accounted for in any ICIR regime.
At the end of the day, we are left with some indication—both in political and legal terms, domestically and internationally—that individuals and
NSAs should not escape responsibility for their wrongdoing. Few would
quarrel with that basic proposition, at least on an abstract level. Yet, in
many ways, we are also left with a profoundly deficient international legal
system to fulfil that objective, both from normative and institutional standpoints. To many, the UNSC is the deficient institution par excellence. There
is no debate that it is indeed a profoundly imperfect institution. Nevertheless, the practice and precedents analyzed in this account demonstrate that
international individual responsibility can be actuated, but never in a
straight line. It is in its nature to take form amidst the interactions occurring
between a multiplicity of legal regimes, institutional and non-institutional
actors, and legal and political processes.
Within this multi-leveled framework, the UNSC can play a key role in
moving the agenda forward. In fact, it already is by legislating international
obligations that bind individuals and NSAs in the counterterrorism field and
beyond. Several precedents supporting that conclusion have been explored
above. The next logical step is to recognize the UNSC’s ability to enforce
and implement those norms, or other international law duties, against such
actors in a way that is reconcilable with the essence of international responsibility. Ample practice to that effect has also been reviewed and analyzed
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in the preceding pages. While these developments might seem abhorrent to
some international lawyers, they are inescapable facts of international life.
If the broader ideals shared by many remain to fight impunity, instill
life into the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims, remedy environmental harm,
hold the perpetrators and financiers of terrorism accountable, redress HR
and IHL abuses, and so on, then these developments should be welcome.
Regional and domestic courts have proven reluctant to perform their share
of the heavy-lifting on this front, so the international legal system must fill
the void. As demonstrated above, the UNSC already attributes wrongful
conduct and assigns responsibility to both states and nonstate entities. It also
devises and imposes consequences flowing from its findings of responsibility on those actors, whether in the form of declarations of wrongdoing, sanctions, or other measures. Thus, future efforts would be better spent on defining the parameters of the framework in which the Council can and should
play a role in advancing ICIR. Dwelling on its imperfections will not remedy the fact that the appetite for greater accountability on the international
scene is not always matched by a correspondingly adequate normative or
institutional arsenal. One step in the right direction is recognizing the Council’s limited but sometimes important role in both norm creation and enforcement. An equally vital step is to develop robust safeguards and meaningful checks on its powers.

